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Abstract 
Corporate governance is not a new issue in today's world. Nevertheless, 
addressing the impact of financial information transparency on investor behavior in the 
stock market should be explored. With the large number of incidents of accounting 
- . , 
fraud and misstatements revealed in the past five to six years, the integrity of business 
financial information becomes an increasingly important issue for investors and the 
general public. To provide greater definition of the roles and responsibilities of 
publicly-owned company executives and members of their boards of directors, U.S. 
President George W. Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) into law on July 30, 
2002. This act provides a framework for greater financial transparency for 
publicly-traded companies and adds increased monitoring responsibility for 
representatives of the accounting and legal professions, as well as adding to the 
responsibilities of directors and executives. 
There has been little empirical research to explore this phenomenon in the Taiwan 
Stock Market. The purpose of this explanatory mixed study was to explore the 
relationship between financial information transparency and investor behavior. The study 
examined TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions, 
investor demographics, and investor experience as significant explanatory variables of 
investor behavior in the TSEC. 
This research design employed a mixed method approach, using 19 closed-ended 
questions, plus one open-ended question on a survey instrument. The survey 
questionnaire, with a closed-ended 1 to 9 Likert scale, was used to ask participants the 
extent to which they agree or disagree (9 = very strong agree, 5 = neither agree nor 
disagree, 1 = very strong disagree). Collected data was analyzed by SPSS-analysis. Five 
different statistical analyses were used in this study; descriptive statistics, correlation 
analysis, independent-samples t-test analysis, ANOVA analysis, and multiple regression 
analysis. 
In this study, investor behavior was measured by an instrument of investor 
behavior questionnaire. Three-hundred respondents participated in the data collection. 
Using systematic sampling, they were approached to complete the survey questionnaire at 
the entrance located outside an underwriter's office. Findings indicated that ownership 
structure, financial transparency, and board structure were significant explanatory 
variables of investor behavior. Therefore, improved financial information transparency 
can lead to an increase investment in the Taiwan Stock Market. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Chapter o n e  introduces financial information transparency and corporate ', 
governance and its impact on investor behavior. Included are introductions to the 
background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose .of :the study, research 
questions, importance of the study, research design rationale, and delimitations and 
scope. 
Background of the Study 
For almost a decade the transparency of business financial information has been 
an important influence on investors' investment strategies. An increasing amount of 
research shows that the availability and quality of companies' financial information are 
two major factors influencing investors' investment decisions (Young, 2003). Recent 
cases of accounting fraud, financial misstatements and poor corporate governance have 
become widely publicized, including financial scandals at Enron, Worldcorn, Adelphia, 
Tyco, Global Crossing, NiCor, Sprint, and Merck. These cases, among others, have 
caused many investors to lose confidence in capital markets worldwide (Kulzick, 2004; 
Ramirez, 2003). According to a 2002 Gallup poll, 70 percent of U.S. investors said that 
corporate accounting issues haunted the investment climate (Kulzick, 2004). Since the 
Enron scandal, poor corporate governance resulting in a lack of financial information 
transparency has shaken public confidence (Young, 2003). 
In order to understand the potential impact of financial transparency on investor 
behavior, it is important to define the term transparency. Florini (1998) indicates that 
transparency is the opposite of secrecy. Secrecy means deliberately hiding one's actions, 
while transparency means deliberately revealing them. Financial transparency is one kind 
of transparency, typically relevant to finance issues which include information accuracy, 
completeness, thoroughness, and timeliness ('v'ishwanath, & Kaufinann, 2001). In today's 
sensitive investment environment, many investors focus on the importance of information 
transparency in companies' strategies. Lack of information and uncertainty are inherent 
features of finance, because players in capital markets are engaged in the trade of 
investments and information (Adimati & Pfleiderer, 2000). 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange was established on July 10, 1962, and became 
operational on December 10th of the same year. The main functions of the TSEC include: 
offering the facility for trading securities; making the rules of the stock exchange; 
accepting listing applications; arranging the listing of securities;. supervising. securities 
trading; and managing and announcing market information. The trading time is from 9 
am to 1:30 pm, Monday through Friday. By the end of 2004, the stock exchange had 697 
listed companies, 114 security brokers, 47 security dealers, and the total market value of 
the stock was 423, 912 million US ,dollars. The total amount of transactions was 723,495 
million US dollars, and the domestic individuals completed 76 percent of securities 
transactions. The TSEC oversight is done by the National Treasury Department (TSEC, 
2004). 
Statement of the Problem 
Over the past decade, global and national markets have experienced finaneial 
crises. A leading reason for these markets' crises was insufficient transparent financial 
information. This has negatively impacted public confidence in capital markets 
(Sridharan, 2002). Against this backdrop, the U.S. Congress began hearings concerning 
Enron in February 2002. The hearings focused on the misleading accounting 
information its corporate leaders had disseminated. As the hearings progressed, they were 
expanded to include a broader range of independent outside agencies, such as Arthur 
Andersen, which was Enron's auditor. 
Corporate scandals such as Enron's have inflicted heavy losses, not only in public 
confidence, but also to the U.S. stock market. Kulzick (2004) stated, "Although only 
a part of this was attributable to fraud, political momentum built rapidly to install greater 
controls to decrease the likelihood of future corporate fraud and to increase financial 
transparency in the U.S. financial markets" (p. 43). 
Purpose of the Study 
The impact of financial information transparency on investor confidence in the 
worldwide market was selected for this review because a number of high profile cases of 
accounting fraud and misstatements of unprecedented proportion have dominated news 
headlines since 2000. Problems at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, and Sunbeam 
were daily news, as was the rapid fall of Arthur Anderson. A report issued by the General 
Accounting Office in October 2002 stated that one out of every 10 listed public 
companies had restated its earnings during the previous five years (as cited in Atkins, 
1999). 
The goals of the financial transparency regulations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are 
. 
to create a governance oversight framework for the accounting profession and its 
practices, which are deslgned to improve investor confidence in financial capital markets. 
The purposes of this research were to explore the relationship between financial 
transparency and investor behavior; to examine corporate governance theories, corporate 
performance, investor trading behavior, and investor decision-making which was 
designed to improve investor confidence in Taiwanese financial markets; and to identify 
areas for future scholarly inquiry. 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The aim of this study was to explore the key factors that may explain the impact 
of financial information transparency on investor behavior in Taiwanese high-tech 
companies that are listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The findings of this dissertation 
are likely to make significant contributions to the future design of investor behavior, due 
to the in-depth analysis of the characteristics that are inherent in investor behavior. 
This research study investigated investors' attitudes and perceptions regarding 
information transparency. Specifically, the researcher sought to determine how a certain 
set of independent variables affect a particular dependent variable. The major 
independent variable used in the study was financial information transparency. The 
dependent variable was investor behavior. The central question addressed by this study 
was how the level of financial transparency is able to convince an investor to invest, and 
repeatedly return to the stock market. 
The specific research questions and hypothesis for this study are as follows: 
Research Questions 
1. Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of 
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan ,Stock 
Market? 
2. Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of 
financial information transparency according to demographic variables? 
3. Are there difference in TSEC investor behavior according to different 
categories of investor experience? 
Hypothesis 
H: TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions, 
investor demographic, and investor experience are significant explanatory 
variables of investor behavior in the TSEC. 
Importance of the Study 
It is worth exploring the significance of the role of government-imposed investor 
protection actions, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), on the ethical behavior of 
corporate officers, as well as the relationship between the transparency of corporate 
financial information and levels of investor confidence. The U.S. Government is looking 
to boost international investor confidence levels as explained by Kulzick (2004): "If the 
U.S. continues to attract international financial capital and maintain the confidence of 
American investors, improving financial transparency is an important goal. 
Sarbanes-Oxley provides the tools, although, much of the Act remains to be 
implemented" (Kulzick, 2004, Conclusion section, para. 3). Investors expect controls 
embedded in the SOX Act to increase the ease of monitoring corporate governance 
, thereby increasing their confidence in the stock market. Future research may reveal 
: whether or not SOX is successful in increasing investor confidence in U:S. 
This research aimed to investigate the impact of information transparency on 
Taiwanese investors; and open the path for further study into the effects of financial 
information transparency and improved corporate governance on investor confidence. 
Definition of Terms 
The theoretical foundation for this study was established through a literature 
review of pertinent research. The review included identifying relevant research in the 
areas of financial information transparency, transparency requirements, corporate 
governance, and investor behavior. 
T h ~ s  study used a quantitative research method and survey questionnaire to 
further measure the behavior of those investing in the Taiwan stock market. The 
dependent variable is investor behavior. 
In order to answer the research questions of this study, the investigation focused 
on eight independent variables and one dependent variable. The independent variables 
were each linked to two information transparency models (signaling and disclosure), and 
three corporate governance theories (agency, stewardship, and stakeholder). These 
independent variables are ownership structure and investor relations, financial 
transparency and information disclosure, board and management structure and process. 
There are four demographic variables: gender, age, level of education, and annual 
income. The eighth independent variable is an investor's experience in buying 
corporation shares. The dependent variable is investor behavior, which is influenced by 
the independent variables. 
The research design was conducted using a quantitative method approach and 
using closed-ended questions on a survey instrument. The survey included 19 
closed-ended questions, plus an open-ended question at the end. The researcher asked 
participants to rate the question based on a closed-ended 1 to 9 kikert scale format. 
Delimitations and Scope 
The main purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of financial information 
transparency on investor behavior in Taiwan. For that reason, inclusion factors were 
subjects who are familiar with the stock market; who have experience buying corporation 
shares from the Taiwan Stock Exchange; whose age is older than 18 years old; and who 
are willing to fill out a questionnaire based on investor experience. People who do not 
have experience buying corporation shares from the Taiwan Stock Exchange .were 
excluded from this study. 
CHAPTER I1 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
Chapter two provides a review of the literature of key concepts in this study. All 
pertinent literature has been reviewed for this topic in order to facilitate the theory 
development for this study. This scholmly review of earlier work provides an appropriate 
history and recognizes the priority of the work of the others. This review focused only on 
literature and conclusions directly relevant to the subject and the problem addressed in 
the dissertation. 
Chapter two begins with business financial information transparency and 
disclosure requirements, including a relevant literature review of corporate governance, 
corporate social responsibility, and investor behavior. 
Literature Review 
Business Financial Information Transparency and Disclosure 
This theoretical literature review focused on theories of financial information 
transparency and the impact of corporate governance on investor confidence. It began 
with the concepts and theories of financial information transparency and moved on to 
theories of corporate governance, which are both important for understanding investor 
confidence and their investment strategies. 
Financial Information Transparency 
The theoretical base for this section is Signaling Theory which was created by 
Spence in 1973. Spence asserted that asymmetric information exists between a company. 
8 
and investors. Such information asymmetry results in investors misunderstanding the real 
operating situation within a company. According to Modigliani and Miller (as Chen, 
1999), this theory assumes that because managers often have better information than 
outside investors, they sell company stock when they perceive it to be overvalued, and 
they sell bonds if they believe the stock is undervalued. Investors understand this 
perspective and, as a result, they view insider stock sales as a negative signal. According 
to signaling theory, the information asymmetry between internal and external .investors 
may create an unfair trading advantage for insiders in financial markets (Chen;. 1999; 
Chiang, 2005; Spence, 1973). Information asymmetry potentially creates higher risk for 
non-insiders who may not clearly understand a company's performance outlook. (Leland 
& Pyle, 1977; Bhattacharya, 1979; Poitevin, 1990; Ravid & Saring, 1991). 
Anonymous (1999) defined financial transparency as meaning clarity, clearness, 
and comprehensibility about what is occurring within a corporation. The definition of 
financial transparency provided by Anonymous was applied to corporations' annual 
reports, 10-Ks, quarterly reports, and other published material. After the Enron scandal, 
investor expectations of financial transparency in the stock market increased. Holzner 
& Holzner (2002) indicated that transparency is "The demand for information freedom, 
epitomized by the current movement toward comprehensive transparency, has a long and 
troubled history, often advanced by scandals" (p.152). Good management of information 
transparency relies on good corporate governance and good ethical behavior (Holzner, et 
al., 2002). 
Transparency is the reverse of secrecy, and secrecy involves someone trying to 
hide some behavior or actions carefully to get benefit for a certain group or individual, 
such as insider trading. However, the perception of the degree of information 
transparency is experienced by each person individually, and follows personal, specific 
emotions. Financial information transparency is one kind of transparency that is 
a typically relevant to corporate finance issues (Vishwanath, & Kaufmann, 2001). 
According to a study by Uddin and Gillett (2002), most financial crises during the past 
ten years can be attributed to a lack of companies' financial transparency. According to 
Hanson (2003), deficiencies in financial market transparency have been due to imperfect 
regulations that have been established to monitor companies' corporate governance and 
ethical behavior. 
Florini (1998) stated that financial transparency is a behavior which constitutes 
appropriate responsibility. A corporation's financial transparency is measured by its 
efforts to disclose such information (Anonymous, 1999). One symptom of a lack of 
financial transparency is insider trading. Insider trading has been not only an obstacle to 
increasing market efficiency, but it has also increased investor concerns about capital 
markets (Fried, 2003; Pritchard, 2003). Insider trading usually provides asymmetrical 
information to the public (O'Hara, 2000). 
Financial Information Disclosure Requirements 
Information is reported by representatives of public companies to the public and 
addresses SEC requirements. Such information disclosures must be monitored and 
overseen by internal control systems as well as third parties, which include companies'; 
Boards of Directors and the SEC in the U.S. For example, a company's financial 
forecast should be approved by its Board's audit committee and public accountant. Only 
after such approval is it reported to the SEC and released to the general public (Admati & 
, I  Pfleiderer, 2000). Examples of transparency problems in these types of information 
disclosures may include irrelevant, misrepiesented, inaccurate, and/or untimely 
information (Admati; et al., 2000; Chiang, 2005; Vishwanath, & Kahfhann, 2001). 
Vishwanath and Kauhann (2001) created a model to measure financial 
transparency for their methodological study. They came up with the following three 
criteria: (a) accessibility, (b) relevance, and (c) quality and reliability. Accessibility 
focused on businesses' communication of financial information to the public. This 
concept was tested by reviewing Internet, radio, television, newspaper, and other public 
notices of companies' financial information. Limitations of measuring accessibility 
included recipients' lack of education and/or knowledge of how to utilize the facilities 
used to transmit financial information. 
The second criterion, relevance, relates to the applicability of the financial 
information provided to specific investors. Because it is difficult to determine what 
information is appropriate, Vishwanath and Kaufmann asserted that relevance depended 
on the situation or condition a specific user faced. For example, banks receive and 
review relevant information through companies' balance sheets and income statements 
when analyzing loan or mortgage cases. On the other hand, dividend pay-out statements 
are very important and relevant financial information for shareholders surveying their 
portfolios (Vishwanath & Kaufmann, 2001). 
The relevance of information provided by companies varies because different 
readers have different information requirements. Irrelevant information may conhse 
users or lead them to make incorrect or suboptimal investment decisions for their 
personal or professional financial strategies (Vishwanath & Kaufmann, 2001). Therefore, 
companies have ethical responsibilities to disclose information that is appropriate to 
various users for their evaluation. At the same time, users must have the ability to sift 
through the totality of information released by companies in a manner appropriate for 
their own particular needs (Vishwanath et al., 2001) 
The third criterion studied, quality and reliability, indicates that published 
financial information must be effective, clea, and simple. In general, the quality of 
companies' financial information is monitored by outside independent agencies such as 
public accountants or attorneys, as well as by regulatory bodies such as the SEC. 
Released information must also conform to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). The quality and reliability of published financial information is 
imperfectly regulated due to the fact that adherence to standards is not enforced or 
monitored by independent outside agencies, nor by inside review boards who address 
financial information disclosure issues (Vishwanath & Kaufmann, 2001). As 
Vishwanath and Kaufmann (2001) state: "the lack of financial transparency and poor 
government accountability will be mutually reinforcing. This unregulated environment 
underscores the importance of working to improve transparency in the economy as a 
whole rather than in narrow sectors." (p.57). Measurements such as those developed by 
Vishwanath and Kaufinann are helpful tools. 
There are information transparency issues outside the U.S. as well. For example, 
after information transparency scandals at Italy's food fm Parmalat and Dutch retailer 
Ahold became publicized, European Union of5cials have asked more than 7,000 EU 
firms to examine their financial reports under International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) (Jucca, 2004). 
Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is concerned with managing the relationship among various 
corporate stakeholders, and has existed in business since the origin of the limited liability 
form of corporation (Lashgari, 2004). In other words, corporate governance includes the 
formal and informal contractual agreements among corporate stakeholders (North, 1994). 
There are many theories of corporate governance, and different authors have studied 
corporate governance in different ways. In 1996, Hawley and Williams completed a 
working paper about corporate governance in U. S. corporations for the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The authors followed the corporate 
governance guidance issued by the OECD and explained that the primary theories of 
corporate governance were agency theory, stewardship theory, and stakeholder theory. 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory arises in business management and interacts with behavioral 
studies of employer-contractor or employer-employee relations. Agency theory can also 
be applied to public and non-profit organizations. Agency theory originally developed 
from research dealing with incomplete information in insurance industry contracts 
(Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973). However, this theory was soon generalized 
to apply to public corporations (Jenson and Meckling, 1976; Harris and Raviv, 1978). 
The main goal of agency theory is how to get the employee or contractor (agent) 
to act in the best interests of the principal (the employer), when the employee or 
contractor has an informational advantage over the principal and has 'different interests 
from the principal. Sappington (1991) provided a valuable discussion of principal-agent 
incentive problems. The agency problem is particularly sharp in Anglo cultures that tend 
to have dispersed business ownership where corporations do not have supervisory boards - : 
and little to no direct relationships with their investors (Monks, 1994). When all 
shareholders own small minority interests, creating diverse ownership, it is not rational 
for any investor to spend hisker time or expense supervising management for other 
investors. In any event, small shareholders may lack the power and influence to acquire 
information which management should disclose (Monks, 1994). 
In their work on agency theory, Hawley and Williams (1996) indicated, "In the 
finance view, the central problem in corporate governance is to construct rules and 
incentives (that is, implicit or explicit contracts) to effectively align the behavior of 
managers (agents) with the desires of principals (owners)" (~121)-  In accordance with 
proponents of agency theory, governments across the world have developed differing sets 
of regulations to oversee corporate governance. Important corporate governance 
regulations in the U.S. marketplace include Securities and Exchange (SEC) regulations, 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and, most recently, regulations 
introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). 
Stewardship Theory 
The discussion concerning the concepts of stewardship theory was begun by 
Pfeffer (1972), when she asserted the fact that Boards of Directors were redundant 
because internal managers are already well-positioned to represent the best interests of a 
company's shareholders. Research by Pfeffer (1972) showed that the true value of 
external directors is the fact that their presence on a Board enhances external investor 
confidence. She found that the more regulated an industry was, the more likely outsiders . 
were to be present on a company's Board of Directors to reassure regulators, bankers, and 
other interest groups. Pfeffer's study was one of the starting points of stewardship theory. 
Donaldson expanded the concepts that Pfeffer provided and developed 
stewardship theory in 1985, which asserts that internal managers are best positioned to 
provide solid corporate governance (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Donaldson & Davis 
(1994) explained that managers are good corporate stewards and diligently work to attain 
high levels of corporate profit and shareholder returns. In commenting on stewardship 
theory, Donaldson & Davis pointed out that a non-executive board of directors is an 
ineffective control mechanism because members are not intimately involved with the 
company and, therefore, lack the in-depth knowledge needed to guide the company to 
positive performance. . 
Stewardship theory is at the root of organizational and corporate governance 
theory as it integrates psychological, sociological, and behavioral systems (Boyd, 1995; 
Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Especially in the typical CEO duality structure, stewardship 
theory explains that executives have superior information that enables them to make clear, 
appropriate decisions for shareholders (Desai, Kroll, & Wright 2003). 
Stakeholder Theory 
According to stakeholder theory, corporate governance must satisfy the needs of 
all stakeholders. Stakeholders include a variety of groups and individuals, such as 
employees, customers, suppliers, and community members who have legitimate concerns 
about a corporation and with whom that corporation was interdependent (American Law 
. Institute, 1992). 
In 1984 Freeman created stakeholder theorq; which provided an important 
contribution to the existing body of modern financial management and corporate 
governance theories (Freeman, 1994). Hill & Jones (1992) built upon existing 
stakeholder theory to explain that the firm does not only belong to shareholders, it also 
belongs to stakeholders, and these stakeholders also need to take responsibility for the 
firm, and enthusiastically participate with the members of the board of directors to 
monitor corporate operating performance (Hill & Jones, 1992). In further explaining 
stakeholder theory Clarkson (1994) stated: "The firm is a system of stakeholders 
operating within the larger system of the host society that provides the necessary legal 
and market infrastructure for the firm's activities. The purpose of the firm is to create 
wealth or value for its stakeholders by converting their stakes into goods and services." (p. 
In 1995 Blair built upon Freeman's stakeholder theory to propose that: "the goal 
of directors and management should be maximizing total wealth creation by the firm" (p. 
322). He explained that to best impact a firm's performance, managers and executives 
should be given ownership-like incentives. These incentives enhance the prospects of 
shareholder wealth creation while providing company leaders with motivation to enhance 
value for all stakeholders (Blair, 1995). 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Jackson (2003) developed a model to explain the impact of inveStor decisions on I 
corporate performance by focusing on the two concepts of external conditions and 
internal conditions. External conditions include protective actions or rules, such as the 
SOX Act and SEC regulations, which force company leaders to disclose information. 
These external conditions enable investors to have more complete information to help 
them evaluate investment opportunities and to develop their strategies. 
Jackson (2003) asserted that an internal condition is when a company has the 
responsibility to provide training for those who use the companies' financial information. 
Although market experts provide a variety of analyst reports, Jackson (2003) asserted that 
enhancing one's knowledge and ability to understand companies' financial reports was 
important to successful investing practices. Rogers (2003) pointed out that investors need 
to have confidence in businesses' governance practices, even for the best performing 
corporations. The average investor's "market model" requires the investor's time to learn 
how to examine information quality and to meaningfully understand information 
disclosures. 
The Corporate Social Responsibility Model (CSR) was developed by Epstein in 
1987. The CSR Model included business ethics, corporate social responsibility, and 
corporate social responsiveness and was designed to explain the  relationship and 
. , . 
. , 
interactions of a corporation with its internal and external stakeholders (Epstein, 1987). 
The Corporate Social Responsibility Model not only. examines aspects of corporate 
performance but also evaluates corporate actions (Epstein, 1987). Ross. (2000) further 
developed the CSR Model by establishing three major measurements: screening, which 
asserts that investors may eliminate gross polluters and other retrograde companies from 
their investments, shareholder activism, which asserts that company may obtain 
discussions and suggestions of CSR issues through the annual shareholder meeting, and 
community development, which asserts that a company may establish corporate 
accountability through interaction with the community. According to the CSR model 
corporate social responsibility is positively correlated with corporate performance and is 
of concern to investors when creating their long-term investment portfolios (Waring & 
Lewer, 2004). 
Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Market efficiency theory can be traced back to 1970 and Fama's Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH). In this famous hypothesis, Fama developed three degrees of 
efficiency, which can be applied to the market. First is strong efficiency, which asserts 
that all public and private information impacts a company's current stock price. All 
information includes insider information. At this degree, no one outsider and insider can 
get a superior benefit. Second is semi-strong efficiency, which asserts that all public 
information is factored into a company's current stock price. Therefore, fkdamental 
analyses including economic, industry, and individual company analyses can not be used 
to attain superior gain. The third degree, weak efficiency, states that all information about 
past prices of a stock are reflected in current stock price. As a result, technical analysis 
can not assist an investor looking for superior gain (Chen, 1999; Sarno & Thornton, 
2004). Technical atlalysis is based on past transaction data and information to predict 
the trend of future stock prices. Fundament analysis is based on the situation of the 
economic environment and corporate performance to analyze the reasoned stock price 
(Chen, 1999). 
Malkiel (2002) built upon existing market efficiency theories to assert that a 
company's stock price will reflect published information about a company. Improving 
the accuracy and timeliness of information disclosures may help the stock market achieve 
more efficiency. Sarno & Thornton (2004) asserted that existing asymmetrical 
information may increase arbitrage behavior in the marketplace. This behavior may make 
advantages for arbitragers who get company information first. 
Jackson (2003) expanded market efficiency theory and separated this theory into 
two groups of different types of individuals. The first group was comprised of experts in 
financial markets, such as market analysts. Experts usually had the benefit of obtaining 
complete financial information based on their educational background or knowledge. 
The second group was the "market model" or the average investor. This group usually 
had little relative knowledge or time to read or understand financial information 
disclosures. This second class of investors relied on the expertise of financial analysts to 
translate disclosure information into investment references or advice. If the first group 
evaluated and translated disclosed information to the market efficiently, and the 
information disclosures were meaningful, the expert group had a way to approach entry 
with sufficient information to move the stock price. The responsibility of the market 
experts was to analyze the disclosures and protect the average investors who did not have 
ability to meaningfully understand disclosed information (Jackson, 2003). 
Investor Behavior 
Reasoned Action Theoy 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) developed the theory of reasoned action for the 
prediction of human behavior intentions. Reasoned action theory integrates physiological, 
psychological, and behavioral systems as well as role theory. The reasoned action 
model explains that humans often organize their behavior by intention (the original 
determination in their mind) and transfer this determination to the action. When humans 
receive related information about their intention, it will change the human determination 
and reflects in their actions. (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
Donaldson and Davis (1994) extended the reasoned action model to apply to the 
business environment. They asserted that corporate performance will reflect the top 
management team's behavior. Positive top management team behavior in a company may 
lead to positive corporate governance, and this positive behavior (intention) will lead to 
high-quality corporate performance (actions). Investors' behaviors and actions often rely 
. on corporate performance, which include financial, operating, and social responsibilities 
of corporate leaders. 
In 2002, Uddin and Gillett added to the application of reasoned action theory to 
business. They explained that the reasoned action model had two dimensions: constructs 
of investor behavior and investors' attitude toward their behavior. Regulation, corporate 
governance, corporate performance, and compensation structure will directly effect 
investors' intentions and actions. Corporate attitude and investor attitude are expected 
to be strongly correlated. Positive corporate attitudes will directly motivate investors' 
20 
attitudes and affect their behavior and actions in the stock market. Negative corporate 
attitude may lead investors to reconsider the inclusion of a company's stock in 'their 
portfolios or to discontinue their investment in the stock market. 
The following section is a review of research that has tested existing theories of 
financial information transparency, financial infomiation disclosure, corporate 
governance, and investor confidence. 
Empirical Literature 
The behavior and confidence of investors have changed recently because of 
companies' financial scandals including those at Enron, Arthur Andersen, and Worldcorn. 
Additionally, accounting fraud at Tyco and questionable CEO compensation packages at 
Tyco and GE have created public awareness of unethical corporate behavior (Moor, & 
Swartz, 2003). Healey & Kim, (2003) found that worldwide investor confidence has 
declined since the Enron scandal, which is attributable to problems with corporate 
financial transparency and information disclosure. 
Business Financial Information Transparency and Disclosure 
This empirical literature review is about business financial information 
transparency and the impact of positive corporate governance on increasing investor 
confidence. This section begins with a review of studies about financial information 
transparency and is followed by reviews of studies about corporate governance and 
investor confidence. 
Financial Information Transparency 
In 2004, Born, :Giaccotto and Ritsatos published a study that examined America's 
insurance industry with respect to signaling theory and financial information transparency. 
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Born, 
Giaccotto and Ritsatos's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and 
contrasting theories about financial information transparency. Empirical studies of 
signaling theory and financial information transparency were examined, identifying a gap 
in the literature regarding whether regulations and monitoring reduce the degree of 
information asymmetry between insurers and investors. Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos' 
research hypotheses were that there is a positive relationship between insurers' stock 
repurchase announcements and insurers' wealth, and that regulation and monitoring have 
positively reduced the degree of information asymmetry between insurers and investors 
(Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos, 2004). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the. data producing sample of 
49 insurance companies trading on either the New York Stock Exchange or American 
Stock Exchange. Reliability and validity were established and data collection procedures 
were clearly described. Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos' findings supported their 
hypotheses and used Tobin's Q ratio (Q-Ratio).to process the data .analysis. The Q-Ratio 
was calculated by dividing the market values of the insurer's equity and debt by their 
book values. A t-test was used to test the difference in mean excess returns between high . . 
and low Q firms and the difference in mean excess returns across lines of business (Born, 
. . 
. . 
Giaccotto and Ritsatos, 2004). 
Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos' interpretation of their findings was that corporate 
wealth does have a significant positive relationship on that company's stock repurchase 
announcement in the open market. They also concluded that regulation and monitoring 
have positively reduced the degree of information asymmetry between insurers and 
investors when compared with non-regulated industry firms. This led to the conclusion 
that insurers can increase company wealth through stock repurchase in the open market. 
The implication is that improving corporate governance can lead to improvements 
in information asymmetry between insurers and investors. Born, Giaccotto and 
Ritsatos' findings support signaling theory. Strengths of Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos' 
study are its clear hypotheses and variables in stock repurchase and information 
asymmetry, and selected reliability and validity of measures of outcome variables which 
result in a generally high level of data quality, data analysis, and clearly defined 
procedures allowing replication. 
In 2005, Chiang published a study that examined Taiwan's high-tech industry 
with respect to signaling theory and financial information transparency. He used a 
non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Chiang's literature 
review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories about financial 
information transparency. Empirical studies of signaling theory and financial information 
transparency were examined, identifying a gap in the literature regarding the impact of 
information transparency on corporate performance especially in the structure of Boards 
of Directors and ownership. Chiang's research hypotheses were that there was a positive 
relationship between the size of Board of Directors and operating performance, and that 
there was a positive relationship between financial transparency and information 
disclosure and operating performance (Chiang, 2005). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of 
225 high-tech companies in Taiwan. The S&P information transparency measurement 
criteria were used to measure the information transparency of selected companies. The 
information transparency measurement criteria were developed by S&P for transparency 
of ownership structure, investor relations, financial transparency, information disclosure, 
and board structure. There were 98 criteria in five categories for a total of 98 points. One 
point was awarded to a company for each criterion met (Chiang, 2005). Reliability and 
validity were established and data collection procedures were clearly described. 
Chiang's findings supported his hypotheses. A multiple regression model (MRM) was 
used to process the data analysis. MRM is a widely used and versatile dependence 
modeling technique applicable to business decision-making (Chiang, 2005). 
Chiang's interpretation of his findings was that corporate transparency does have 
a significant positive relationship on a company's operating performance. This led to the 
conclusion that companies with good corporate governance have a significant positive 
relationship with operating performance. The implication is that improving corporate 
governance can lead to improved corporate performance, and outsiders can comfortably 
rely on information provided by company leaders to make investment decisions. Chiang's 
findings support signaling theory. 
Strengths of Chiang's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in corporate 
transparency and corporate operating performance, and selected reliable and valid 
measures of outcome variables which result in a generally high level of data quality, data 
analysis, and clearly defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by 
Chiang are that the sample only included Taiwanese high-tech companies. He also did not 
clearly define high-tech company in the study. Therefore, the results are difficult to 
generalize to other countries. Future studies should address these threats. to external 
validity, followed by replication. 
Financial Information Disclosure Requirements 
In 2001, Gelb and Strawer published a study that examined American publicly 
traded firms with respect to information disclosure and financial information transparency. 
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Gelb and 
Strawer's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting 
theories about financial information disclosure. Empirical studies of financial information 
disclosure and financial information transparency were examined, and they identified a 
gap in existing literature about an alternative explanation: corporate responsibility and 
financial disclosure for increased transparency. Gelb and Strawer's research hypothesis 
was that firms that are more socially responsible are more likely to provide more 
extensive discretionary disclosures (Gelb and Strawer, 2001). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of 
233 publicly traded firms in United States. Annual reports, 10-Ks, quarterly reports, other 
published materials, and investor relations programs provided by firms were used to 
measure the financial disclosure levels and social responsibility of selected companies 
(Gelb and Strawer, 2001). Reliability and validity were established, and data collection 
procedures were clearly described. Gelb and Strawer's findings supported their 
hypothesis and they used multiple regression analysis to process the data analysis. 
Multiple regression analysis is a widely used and versatile dependence modeling 
technique applicable to business decision-making (Gelb and Strawer, 2001). 
Gelb and Strawer's interpretation of their findings are that both corporate soc~al 
responsibility and financial disclosure have a significant relationship with investor 
concern. This led to the conclusion that companies with high disclosure quality will 
positively maintain investor relationships. Gelb and Strawer's findings support financial 
information disclosure. Strengths of Gelb and Strawer's study are its clear hypotheses 
and variables in financial information disclosure and corporate social responsibility, and 
selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables which result in a generally high 
level of data quality, data analysis, and clearly defined procedures allowing replication. 
In 2003, Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier published a study that examined American 
publicly traded firms with respect to financial information disclosure and corporate 
governance. They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. 
Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier's literature review was thorough and current in comparing 
and contrasting theories about financial information disclosure. Empirical studies of 
financial information disclosure and financial transparency were examined, and they 
identified a gap in existing literature about corporate governance: the role of audit 
committee disclosures. Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier's research hypotheses were that there 
is a relationship between the financial disclosure and audit committee performance, and 
there is a relationship between corporate governance and audit committee performance 
(Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier, 2003). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of 
100 publicly traded firms which are the listed Fortune 100 in the United States. Financial 
statement analysis measurement criteria were used to measure the financial performance 
of selected companies. Financial statement analysis measurement criteria were divided 
into liquidity, asset management, debt management, profitability, and market value ratios 
(Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier, 2003). Reliability and validity were established and data 
collection procedures were clearly described. Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier's findings 
supported their hypotheses and used multiple regression analysis to process the data 
analysis. Multiple regression analysis is a widely used and versatile dependence modeling 
technique applicable to business decision-making (Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier, 2003). 
Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier's interpretation of their findings is that audit 
committee performance does have a significant positive relationship on corporate 
governance and financial disclosure. This led to the conclusion that companies with 
strong audit committee performance will improve corporate governance. The implication 
is that improving corporate governance can lead to improved corporate performance, and 
outsiders can comfortably rely on information provided by companies to make 
investment decisions. Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier's findings support financial disclosure 
theories. 
Strengths of Rezaee, Olibe and Minrnier's study are its clear hypothesis and 
variables in financial disclosure and corporate governance, and selected reliable and valid 
measures of outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality, 
data analysis, and clearly defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations of this 
study are that the survey criteria did not include important regulations of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, which was enacted into law in 2002. The authors suggested that future study should 
address threats to external validity, followed by replication. 
Corporate Governzance 
Agency Theory 
In 2000, Shaw, Gupta, and Delery published a study that examined the United 
States' trucking industry with respect to agency theory They used a non-experimental, 
causal comparative, quantitative study design. Shaw, Gupla, and Delery's literature 
review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories about corporate 
governance. Empirical studies of agency theory and corporate governance were examined, 
identifying a gap in the literature about the impact of a company's performance and 
compensation system on agent monitoring. Shaw, Gupta, and Delery's research 
hypotheses were that agent monitoring was negatively related to the use of performance 
contingent compensation systems, and agent monitoring was positively related to the use 
of performance contingent compensation systems (Shaw, Gupta, and Delery, 2000). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of 
1,072 trucking companies with at least 30 total employees in the United States. The 
primary criterion for inclusion was response to a 24-pages questionnaire. All measures 
were obtained from the questionnaire (Shaw, Gupta, and Delery, 2000). Reliability and 
validity were established and data collection procedures were clearly described. Shaw, 
Gupta, and Delery's findings supported their hypotheses. They used regression analysis 
to test the hypotheses. 
Shaw, Gupta, and Delery's interpretation of their findings is that agency 
predictions and agent monitoring support compensation systems in the organization. This 
led to the conclusion that agency predictions and agent monitoring are positive influences 
in the trucking industry. The implication is that the cross-industry sample represents a 
more traditional organization of work. Typically managers will spend more time 
supervising their front-line employees to ensure the quality of their service. Shaw, 
Gupta, and Delery's findings support agency theory. Strengths of this study are its clear 
hypotheses and variables in agency and collaborative predictions of performance 
contingent compensation, and selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables 
which result in a generally high level of data quality, data.analysis, and clearly defined 
procedures allowing replication. 
In 2003, RandOy, Down, and Jenssen published a study that examined maritime 
firms in Sweden and Norway with respect to agency theory and corporate governance. 
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. RandOy, 
Down, and Jenssen's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and 
contrasting theories about corporate governance. Empirical studies of agency theory and 
corporate governance were examined, identifying a gap in the literature regarding the 
impact ofxcorporate performance on board performance especially in the structure of 
Boards of Directors and ownership. RandOy, Down, and Jenssen's research hypothesis 
was that Board ownership and independence have a positive influence on the financial 
performance of maritime firms (RandOy, Down, and Jenssen, 2003). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of 
59 publicly traded maritime companies in Sweden and Norway. Financial statement 
analysis measurement criteria were used to measure the financial performance of selected 
companies. Financial statement analysis measurement criteria were divided into liquidity, 
asset management, debt management, profitability, and market value ratios (RandOy; 
Down, and Jenssen, 2003). Reliability and validity were established and data collection 
procedures were clearly described. RandOy, Down, and Jenssen's findings supported 
their hypothesis and used multiple ordinary least-squares regression analysis to process 
the data analysis. Multiple ordinary least-squares regression analysis is a widely used and 
versatile dependence modeling technique applicable to business decision-making 
(RandOy, Down, and Jenssen, 2003). 
RandOy, Down, and Jenssen's interpretation of their findings is that Board 
independence is associated with higher performance at maritime firms in Sweden and 
Norway. This led to the conclusion that Board performance has a significant positive 
relationship with financial performance and corporate governance. The implication is that 
improving board performance can lead to improved financial performance and corporate 
performance, and outsiders can comfortably rely on information provided by company 
leaders to make investment decisions. 
RandOy, Down, and Jenssen's findings support agency theory. Strengths of 
RandOy, Down, and Jenssen's study are its clear hypothesis and variables in Board 
independence and financial performance, and selected reliable and valid measures of 
outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality, data analysis, 
and clearly defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by RandOy, 
Down, and Jenssen are that the sample only included firms from the maritime industry, 
therefore, the results are difficult to generalize to other industries. Future studies should 
address these threats to external validity, followed by replication. 
Trailer, Rechner, and Hill (2004) conducted a study about agency theory to 
examine public-private partnerships and to test agency theory in the United States. They 
used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative design, of public-private 
partnerships. Trailer, Rechner, and Hill's literature review was thorough and current in . r 
comparing and contrasting theories about corporate governance. Empirical studies of 
agency theory were examined, leading to identification of an important gap in the , 
literature about agency theory and conflict in multiple firms such as public-private 
partnerships. Trailer, Rechner, and Hill's research hypotheses were that the division of 
revenues between public and private organizations is Pareto optimal, and the structure of 
revenue appropriation that grants the public partner non-residual payments will not have 
a negative association with the operating efficiency of the partnership (Trailer, Rechner, 
and Hill, 2004). 
Aprobability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of a 
group of private companies in partnership with universities. However, the sample size 
was not clearly described in the study. Reliability and validity were established, and data 
collection procedures were clearly described. Trailer, Rechner, and Hill's findings 
supported their hypotheses and they used a multiple regression model (MRM) to process 
the data analysis. Trailer, Rechner, and Hill used the Pareto optimality method to test their 
hypotheses. The optimality method is one that balances tradeoffs between the other 
stakeholders such that each party is made as well off as possible. Ultimately, tradeoffs 
exist such that past a certain point, one party can not benefit further unless another party 
becomes worse off (Trailer, Rechner, and Hill, 2004). 
Trailer, Rechner, and Hill's interpretation of this finding is that agency problems 
exist in public-private partnerships. They concluded that a public organization has a 
rwponsibility to its own agent and also needs to ensure the best interests of its customers. 
Trailer, Rechner, and Hill's findings support agency theory. Strengths of the study 
reported by Trailer, Rechner, and Hill are its clear hypotheses and variables in multiple 
public-private partnerships, and selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables 
which resulted in a generally high level of data quality, data analysis, and clearly defined 
procedures allowing replication. The main limitation is that the sample size was not 
clearly stated, and that its results may not be generalizable to partnerships that are not 
non-public-private. Future studies should address these threats to external validity, 
followed by replication. 
Stewardship Theory 
In 2003, Desai, Kroll, and Wright published a study that examined American 
manufacturing firms with respect to stewardship theory and acquisition announcements. 
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Desai, 
Kroll, and Wright's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and 
contrasting theories about stewardship and corporate governance. Empirical studies of 
stewardship theory and acquisition governance were examined, and the authors identified 
a gap in existing literature about corporate governance in organizations. Desai, Kroll, and 
Wright's research hypotheses were that the presence of CEO duality will be negatively 
associated with acquisition performance, and in the presence of CEO duality, the 
percentage of outside board members will be positively associated with acquisition 
performance (Desai, Kroll, and Wright, 2003). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of 
149 publicly traded U.S. companies. The event-study methodology was used to measure 
the acquisition performance of selected companies, and they used cumulative abnormal 
returns analysis to estimate each acquiring firm. The event-study methodology is widely 
used for measuring the impact of various relevant events on the market value of 
corporations (Desai, Kroll, and Wright, 2003). Reliability and validity were established, 
and data collection procedures were clearly described. Desai, Kroll, and Wright's 
findings supported their hypotheses, and they used a multiple regression model (MREa) 
for data analysis. MRM is a widely used and versatile dependence modeling technique 
applicable to business decision-making (Desai, Kroll, and Wright, 2003). 
Desai, Kroll, and Wright's interpretation of their findings is that outsider board 
ownership is positively related to the performance of the entire company after they make 
a major acquisition in the presence of CEO duality. These findings led to the conclusion 
that an independent leadership structure is more beneficial for acquisition performance. 
The implication is that, in the presence of CEO duality, monitoring through a Board of 
Directors populated by outsiders is another way to ensure owner-interested action. Desai, 
Kroll, and Wright's findings support stewardship theory. Strengths of Desai, Kroll, and 
Wright's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in corporate governance and 
acquisition performance, selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables which 
resulted in a generally hgh level of data quality, data analysis, and clearly defined 
procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by Desai, Kroll, and Wright are that 
the study did not include institutional investors, because they could affect the relationship 
between CEO duality and performance. Future studies should address these threats to 
external validity, followed by replication. 
In 2004, Leng published a study that examined Malaysian publicly traded 
companies with respect to stewardship theory and corporate governance. He used a 
' 
non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Leng's literature review 
was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories about corporate 
governance. Empirical studies of stewardship theory and corporate governance were 
examined, identifying a gap in the literature about corporate governance practices in the . 
developing countries. Leng's research hypothesis was that there is some quality of 
corporate governance that leads to better financial performance (Leng, 2004). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of 
77 publicly traded companies in Malaysia. Financial statement analysis measurement 
criteria were used to measure the financial performance of selected companies. Financial 
statement analysis measurement criteria were divided into liquidity, asset management, 
debt management, profitability, and market value ratios (Leng, 2004). Reliability and 
validity were established, and data collection procedures were clearly described. Leng's 
findings supported the hypotheses, and he used multiple regression analysis for the data 
analysis. Multiple regression analysis is an extensively used and versatile dependence 
modeling technique applicable to business decision-making (Leng, 2004). 
Leng's interpretation of his findings is that corporate governance does have a 
significant positive relationship on a company's financial performance. These findings 
led to the conclusion that companies with some quality of corporate governance have 
better financial performance. The implication is that improving corporate governance can 
lead to improved financial performance. As a result, outsiders can comfortably rely on 
information provided by company leaders to make investment decisions. Leng's findings 
support stewardship theory. Strengths of Leng's study are its clear hypotheses and 
variables in corporate governance and financial performance, as well as its reliable and 
valid measures outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality 
and analysis and clearly defined procedures allowing replication. 
Stakeholder Theory 
In 1999, Luoma and Goodstein published a study that examined American 
publicly traded firms with respect to stakeholder theory and corporate performance. They 
used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Luoma and 
Goodstein's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting 
theories about stakeholder performance. Empirical studies of stakeholder theory and 
corporate governance were examined, and the authors identified a gap in the existing 
literature about the effect of stakeholder and corporate performance on board composition 
and structure. Luoma and Goodstein's research hypotheses was that the Board of 
Directors of corporations in more highly regulated industries will have greater 
proportions of directors who are non-shareholder stakeholders, and Board of Directors of 
larger corporations will have greater proportions of directors who are non-shareholder 
stakeholders (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of 
224 publicly traded firms in United States (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). Reliability 
and validity were established, and data collection procedures were clearly described. 
Luoma and Goodstein's findings supported the hypotheses, and. they used logistic and 
hierarchical regression analyses to process the data analysis. These methods are 
appropriately and widely used when the dependent variable or independent variables are 
dichotomous in a study (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). 
Luoma and Goodstein's interpretation of their findings is that Board of Directors 
structure does have a significant relationship with highly regulated industries and 
organization size. These findings led to the conclusion that larger corporations, in 
particularly have greater proportions of stakeholder representation on their Boards. The 
implication is that more highly regulated industries and larger corporations have more 
proportions of stakeholder directors on their Board to monitor corporate performance. 
Luoma and Goodstein's findings support stakeholder theory. Strengths of Luoma and 
Goodstein's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in stakeholder director and board 
structure, as well as selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables which 
resulted in a generally high level of data quality, data analysis, and clearly defined 
procedures allowing replication. 
In 2003, Riahi-Belkaoui published a study that examined American 
manufacturing and service firms with respect to stakeholder theory and corporate 
governance. He used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. 
Riahi-Belkaoui's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting 
theories about stakeholders. Empirical studies of stakeholder theory and corporate 
governance were examined, and the author identified a gap in the existing literature about 
intellectual capital and US multinational firm performance. Riahi-Belkaoui's research 
hypothesis was that intellectual capital will positively affect financial performance 
(Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of 
100 manufacturing and service firms in United States. Financial statement analysis 
measurement criteria were used to measure the financial.and non- financial performance 
I 
of selected companies. Financial statement analysis measurement criteria were divided 
into liquidity, asset management, debt management, profitability, and market value ratios 
- (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003). Reliability and validity were established, and data collection' 
procedures were clearly described. Riahi-Belkaoui's findings supported the hypothesis, 
and he used a regression model for data analysis. The regression model is a widely used 
and versatile dependence modeling technique applicable to business decision-making 
(Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003). 
Riahi-Belkaoui's interpretation of his findings is that intellectual capital does have 
a significant positive relationship on financial performance. This finding led to the 
conclusion that companies with good corporate governance concerning intellectual 
capital have significantly higher levels of financial performance. The implication is that 
improving governance of intellectual capital can create organizational wealth. 
Riahi-Belkaoui's findings support stakeholder theory. 
Strengths of Riahi-Belkaoui's study are its clear hypothesis and variables in 
intellectual capital and multinational firms, and selected reliable and valid measures of 
outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality and analysis. 
Additionally, the study had clearly defined procedures allowing for replication. 
Limitations reported by Riahi-Belkaoui are that the author did not test samples of non-US 
firms. Future studies should address these threats to external validity, followed by 
replication. 
In 2004, Dimovski and Skerlavaj published a study that examined Slovenian 
publicly traded companies with respect to stakeholder theory and corporate governance. 
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Dimovski 
and Skerlavaj's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting 
theories about corporate governance. Empirical studies of stakeholder theory and 
corporate governance were examined, identifying a gap in the literature about 
organizational performance and the influence of information communication technology. 
Dimovski and Skerlavaj's research hypotheses were that information and communication 
technology have a positive impact on financial performance, and that information and 
communication technology have a positive impact on non-financial performance 
(Dimovski and Skerlavaj, 2004). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of 
867 publicly traded companies in Slovenia. Financial statement analysis measurement 
criteria were used to measure financial and non- financial performance of selected 
companies. Financial statement analysis measurement criteria were divided into liquidity, 
asset management, debt management, profitability, and market value ratios (Dimovski 
and Skerlavaj, 2004). Reliability and validity were established, and data collection 
procedures were clearly described. Dimovski and Skerlavaj's findings supported their 
hypotheses, and they used structural equation model to process the data analysis 
(Dimovski and Skerlavaj ,2004). 
Dimovski and Skerlavaj's interpretation of their findings is that there is a 
significantly positive relationship between information communication technology and 
financial performance. This led to the conclusion that a company using information 
communication technology can lead to better organizational financial performance. The 
implication is that a company using information communication technology can lead to 
better organizational financial performance and contribute the result to the stakeholder 
and shareholder. Dimovski and Skerlavaj's findings support stakeholder theory. 
Strengths of Dimovski and Skerlavaj's study are its clear hypotheses and variables 
in information communication technology and organizational financial performance, and 
selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables which resulted in a generally 
high level of data quality and analysis, and clearly defined procedures allowing 
replication. Limitations reported by Dimovski and Skerlavaj are that there is a need to 
expand the sample, and future studies should address these threats to external validity, 
followed by replication. 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
In 2003, McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd published a study that examined American 
publicly traded firms with respect to corporate social responsibility and corporate 
performance. They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study 
'design. McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd's literature review was thorough and current in 
comparing and contrasting theories about corporate social responsibility. Empirical 
studies of corporate social responsibility and corporate performance were examined, and 
the authors identified a gap in existing literature about CEO incentives and corporate 
social performance. One of McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd's research hypotheses 
demonstrated the relationship between corporate governance and strong social 
performance, which is stronger for firms with a higher percentage of shareholders who 
are activist institutional investors (McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd, 2003). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of 
374 publicly traded firms in United States. The Kinder, Lindenberg, and Domino (KLD) 
database was used to measure corporate social performance of selected companies. The 
KLD database is a multidimensional corporate social performance database. There are 
, four dimensions of the KLD database: employee, community, product, and environment, 
and each dimension has a scale rating from 0 (neutral) to 2 (significant strengths or 
weaknesses) used to evaluate firms (McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd, 2003). Reliability 
and validity were established, and data collection procedures were clearly described. 
McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd's findings supported their hypotheses, and they used 
multiple regression analysis to process the data analysis. Multiple regression analysis is a 
widely used and versatile dependence modeling technique applicable to business 
decision-making (McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd, 2003). 
McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd's interpretation of their findings is that corporate 
govemance does have a significant positive relationship on a company's corporate social 
performance. This led to the conclusion that companies with good corporate govemance 
have a positive social performance. The implication is that improving corporate 
governance can lead to improved corporate social performance, and this positive social 
performance can interest more institutional investors. McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd's 
findings support the corporate social responsibility model. Strengths of McGuire, Dow, 
and Argheyd's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in corporate social 
performance and corporate governance, and selected reliable and valid measures of 
outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality and analysis, as 
well as clearly defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by McGuire, 
Dow, and Argheyd are that this study did not examine the link between social strengths 
and weaknesses and firm performance. Future studies should address these threats to 
external validity, followed by replication. 
In 2003, Snider, Hill & Martin published a study that examined global and 
.American publicly traded firms with respect to corporate responsibility and corporate 
performance. They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, qualitative study design. 
Snider, Hill & Martin's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and 
contrasting theories about corporate responsibility. Empirical studies of corporate 
responsibility and corporate performance were examined, and the authors identified a gap 
in existing literature about corporate social responsibility in the 21St century. Snider, Hill 
& Martin's research question was, what is the content of issues within stakeholder groups 
that leading firms address on their websites regarding corporate social responsibility 
(Snider, Hill & Martin, 2003)? 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of 
100 global firms which included 50 U.S. firms. The grounded theory method was used to 
measure levels of information transparency of selected companies. The grounded theory 
method is a way to methodically collect and analyze data for the building of study (Snider, 
Hill & Martin, 2003). Reliability and validity were established, and data collection 
procedures were clearly described. Snider, Hill & Martin's findings supported the 
research question, and they used qualitative content analysis to process the data analysis 
(Snider, Hill & Martin, 2003). 
Snider, Hill & Martin's interpretation of their findings is that this study discloses 
that both sets of organizations concentrate attention on a similar set of stakeholders and 
approximately the same corporate social responsibility issues. This led to the conclusion 
that the most successful firms in the US, and worldwide, concentrate more attention on 
corporate social responsibility than other less successful firms do. The implication is that 
improving corporate social responsibility can lead to improved corporate performance 
and firm success in the United States and worldwide. 
Snider, Hill & Martin's findings support the corporate social responsibility model. 
Strengths of Snider, Hill & Martin's study are its clear research question and purpose in 
corporate social responsibility and corporate performance, and selected reliable and valid 
measures, which resulted in a generally high level of data and data analysis, as well as 
clearly defined procedures allowing replication. The main limitation reported by Snider, 
Hill & Martin was that their qualitative study design did not include quantitative research, 
and as a result, researchers do not know how frequently identified CRS Model was 
disseminated. They suggested that future research use a quantitative methodology to test 
their conclusions. 
In 2005, Flouris and Walker published a study that examined the U.S. aviation 
industry with respect to investor confidence and financial performance. They used a 
non-experimental, causal comparative, qualitative study design. Flouris and Walker's 
literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories about 
investor confidence. Empirical studies of investor confidence and financial performance 
were examined, identifying a gap in the literature about the financial performance of full 
service airlines in times of crisis. Flouris and Walker's research question included, what 
is the content of issues within the aviation industry for lead investors who are interested 
in the companies' financial performance (Flouris and Walker, 2005)? 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of 
three major full service airlines in United States. Financial statement analysis 
measurement criteria were used to measure financial and non- financial performance of 
selected companies. Financial statement analysis measurement criteria were divided into 
liquidity, asset management, debt management, profitability, and market value ratios 
(Flouris and Walker, 2005). Reliability and validity were established, and data 
collection procedures were clearly described. Flouris and Walker's findings supported . .  . 
the research question, and they used qualitative content analysis for data analysis. 
Flouris and Walker's interpretation of their findings is that a company's financial 
performance has a positive relationship on investor confidence and interest. This led to 
the conclusion that companies with good financial performance, in particular profitability 
ratios, will have more interested investors. The implication is that improving financial 
performance can attract interested investors and regain their confidence in the stock 
market. Flouris and Walker's findings support the investor confidence model. 
Strengths of Flouris and Walker's study are its clear research question and 
purpose about investor confidence and financial performance, selected reliable and valid 
measures which resulted in a generally high level of data and data analysis, and clearly 
defined procedures allowing replication. The main limitation reported by Flouris and 
Walker was that their qualitative study design did not include quantitative research, and 
as a result, the researchers do not know how frequently identified confidence massages 
were disseminated. They suggested that future research use a quantitative method to test 
their conclusions. 
EfJicient Market Hypothesis 
In 2004, Fraser published a study that examined U.S. and Japanese investors with 
respect to the efficient market hypothesis model and their expectations. She used a 
non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Fraser's literature 
review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories about efficient 
market hypothesis. Empirical studies of efficient market hypothesis and investor behavior 
were examined, and she identified a gap in existing literature about how U.S. and 
Japanese investors process information, and how they form their expectations of the 
future. Fraser's research hypotheses were that both U.S. and Japanese investors will be 
pessimistic about their expectations for the future of the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
Stock Index and the Japanese Stock Index, if they do not offer timely corporate 
information to investors (Fraser, 2004). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of 
institutional investors both of United States and Japan. A mailed questionnaire was used 
to gather information from selected investors. Reliability and validity were established, 
and data collection procedures were clearly described. Fraser's findings supported the 
hypotheses. She used multiple regression analysis to process the data. Multiple regression 
analysis is a widely used and versatile dependence modeling technique applicable to 
business decision-making (Fraser, 2004). 
Fraser's interpretation of her findings is that stock market efficiency does have a 
significant relationship on investor expectations. This led to the conclusion that investor 
expectations will increase in efficient stock markets. The implication is that improving 
corporate governance and the efficiency of a stock market can lead to increased investor 
expectations, and investors can comfortably rely on information provided by company 
leaders to make investment decisions. Fraser's findings support the market efficiency 
hypothesis. Strengths of Fraser's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in stock 
market and investor expectations, selected reliable and valid measures of outcome 
variables, which resulted in a generally high level of data and data analysis, and clearly 
defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by Fraser are that the study 
did not state the biased nature of expectations. The researcher should avoid bias in the 
survey. Also, the author did not clearly state the sample size and how the sample was 
selected in the study. Future studies should address these threats to external validity, 
followed by replication. 
Christopherson and Greqoriou (2004) published a study that examined an 
American publicly traded firm with respect to the efficient market model and corporate 
performance. They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study 
design. Christopherson and Greqoriou's literature review was thorough and current in 
comparing and contrasting theories about efficient market hypothesis. Empirical studies 
of efficient market hypothesis and corporate governance were examined, and they 
identified a gap in existing literature about lagged factors affecting Berkshire Hathaway 
returns. Christopherson and Greqoriou's research hypotheses were that there is negative 
relationship between high-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's returns, and there is a 
positive relationshp between low-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's returns 
(Christopherson and Greqoriou, 2004). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of 
Berkshire Hathaway which is listed NYSE and ranked in the Fortune 500. Fifty 
macroeconomic variables and market factors were used to survey the organizational 
performance of the company. Reliability and validity were established, and data 
collection procedures were clearly described. Christopherson and Greqoriou's findings 
supported the hypotheses. They used multiple regression analysis to process data. 
Multiple regression analysis is a widely used and versatile dependence modeling 
technique applicable to business decision-making (Christopherson and Greqoriou, 2004). 
Christopherson and Greqoriou's interpretation of their findings is that there is a 
negative relationship between high-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's return, and 
there is a positive relationship between low-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's return. 
This led to the conclusion that Berkshire's returns can be predicted not only from value 
stocks but also from mid cap growth stocks. Christopherson and Greqoriou's findings 
support the efficient market theory. Strengths of Christopherson and Greqoriou's study 
are its clear hypotheses and variables, selected reliable and valid measures of outcome 
variables, which resulted in a generally high level of data quality and analysis, and clearly 
defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by Christopherson and 
Greqoriou are that the sample only included one unique company; therefore, results are 
difficult to generalize to other industries and companies. Future studies should address 
these limitations and replicate the study for other firms. 
Investor Behavior 
Reasoned Action Theory 
Uddin and Gillett (2002) published a study that examined U.S. publicly traded 
firms with respect to reasoned action theory and the behavior effect of moral reasoning. 
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Uddin and 
Gillett's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting 
reasoned action theories. Empirical studies of reasoned action theory and the behavior 
effect of moral reasoning were examined, and they identified a gap in existing literature 
about the effects of moral reasoning and self-monitoring on CFO intentions to report 
fraudulent information on financial statements. Uddin and Gillett's research hypothesis 
were that high moral reasoners are more influenced than low moral reasoners by their 
own attitude towards the behavior. (Uddin and Gillett, 2002). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of 
2,000 which was drawn from the population of U.S. publicly traded firms. Survey 
questionnaires were used to collect data about the reasoned actions of selected companies. 
Reliability and validity were established, and data collection procedures were clearly 
described. Uddin and Gillett's findings supported the hypothesis. They used multiple 
regression analysis for data analysis. Multiple regression analysis is a widely used and 
versatile dependence modeling technique applicable to business decision-making (Uddin 
and Gillett, 2002). 
Uddin and Gillett's interpretation of their findings is that companies with a CFO 
with high self-monitoring behavior are more disciplined than low self-monitors. Uddin 
and Gillett's findings support reasoned action theory. Strengths of Uddin and Gillett's 
study are its clear hypotheses and variables in reasoned action and moral behavior, 
selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables which resulted in a generally 
high level of data quality and analysis, and clearly defined procedures allowing 
replication. Limitations reported by Uddin and Gillett are that the sample was only 7% of 
selected companies. Future studies should address these threats to external validity, 
followed by replication. 
In 2003, Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary published a study that examined U.S. 
high-technology IPOs with respect to reasoned action theory. They used a 
non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Carpenter, Pollock, and 
Leary's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories 
about reasoned action. Empirical studies of reasoned action theory were examined, and 
they identified a gap in the existing literature about the experience of governance, 
principals, and global strategy in IPO firms. Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary's research 
hypotheses were that there is a positive relationship between firm internationalization and 
top management team's global experience, and that there is a positive relationship 
between firm internationalization and outside Board members' global experience 
(Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary, 2003). 
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of 
256 high-technology IPOs in United States. Survey questionnaires were used to collect 
data about the reasoned actions of selected companies. Reliability and validity were 
established, and data collection procedures were clearly described. Carpenter, Pollock, 
and Leary's findings supported their hypotheses, an$ they used the multiple regression 
model (MRM) to process the data. MRM is a widely used and versatile dependence 
modeling technique applicable to business decision-making (Carpenter, Pollock, and 
Leary, 2003). 
Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary's interpretation of their findings is that firm 
internationalization does have a significantly positive relationship with top management 
team's experience. This led to the conclusion that a top management team with global 
experience has a significantly positive relationship with a firm's internationalization. 
Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary's findings support reasoned action theory. Strengths of 
Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in 
internationalization and corporate performance, selected reliable and valid measures of 
outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality and analysis, 
and clearly defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by Carpenter, 
Pollock, and Leary are that the sample only included high-tech companies in the United 
States. Future studies should address these limitations of external validity, followed by 
replication. 
The gap in this literature review is that some researchers have asserted that greater 
financial transparency addresses investor needs, enhancing investor satisfaction, and 
leading to greater public confidence in financial markets. However, there is little 
empirical research to support this claim. Although some researchers have discussed and 
examined relationships among financial transparency and investor behavior and positive 
investor confidence, no study has yet observed any correlation between investor trading 
behavior and the transparency of disclosure information in the Taiwan stock market. 
Therefore, additional study in this area is needed to discover if greater financial 
transparency in companies listed on the Taiwan stock market is positively correlated with 
improved investor confidence in the Taiwan stock market. 
In order to fill th~s  gap the research will explore the relationship between financial 
information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock Market. The results 
of this study may have a contribution for corporations, investors, and the other 
researchers. Corporations may benefit greatly by identifying the most important factors of 
investors' decisions. Investors may benefit greatly by financial information transparency 
survey. Other researchers may benefit by duplicating this study and finding other factors 
based on this study. 
Summary and Interpretations 
The purpose of this review was to explore existing theoretical and empirical 
literature about the effects of the transparency of business financial information on 
investor confidence, and to examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
investor confidence. A general consensus exists that financial information transparency 
and disclosure will directly affect investor confidence and stock market efficiency. 
Improving corporate governance and regulations will help improve investor confidence in 
stock markets. 
Theoretical Literature 
Financial Information Transparency 
In 1973 Spence developed signaling theory, which presented the idea that 
unbalanced information exists in current financial markets which may create potential 
risks for those using the information (Bhattacharya, 1979; Chen, 1999; Chiang, 2005; 
Leland & Pyle, 1977; Poitevin, 1990; Ravid & Saring, 1991). Anonymous (1999) and 
Holzner and Holzner (2002) further segmented financial transparency into clarity, 
clearness, and comprehensibility, and they asserted that excellent corporate governance 
was reflected by good information transparency. Recent financial scandals were caused 
by lack of financial transparency, unethical behavior and imperfect regulations (Hanson, 
2003; Holzner et al., 2002). 
Financial Information Disclosure Requirements 
Vishwanath and Kaufmann (2001) created a model to measure information 
disclosure. This model assesses information using three factors: accessibility, relevance, 
and quality and reliability. Accessibility was measured by businesses' communication of 
financial information to the shareholders and stakeholders. Relevance was measured by 
whether a company provided appropriate information to shareholders and stakeholders. 
Quality and reliability were described in that a company needed to provide effective, 
clear, and simple information to shareholders and stakeholders (Vishwanath, & 
Kaufmann, 2001). A company publishing financial information to shareholders and 
stakeholders needs to be supervised by regulatory bodies and the company's audit 
committee. Companies are not only monitored by internal control systems such as audit 
committees and Boards of Directors, but also need to be overseen by independent 
accountants and the SEC. (Admati & Pfliederer, 2000). 
Agency Theory 
The original concept of agency theory was developed for the insurance industry to 
explain the behavior of employer-contractor and employer-employee relationships 
(Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973). This concept was soon generalized to other 
industries (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Harris & Raviv, 1978). The agency problem is a 
principle of agency theory which is described as when all shareholders own small 
percentages of the capital of a firm so that they lack power and influence to acquire 
information and directly oversee the management (Monks, 1994; Hawley & Williams, 
1996). 
Stewardship Theory 
The roots of stewardship theory were developed by Donaldson in 1985 who 
integrated psychological and sociological and behavioral systems (Boyd, 1995; 
Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Desai, Kroll, and Wright (2003) extended stewardship 
theory to explain a manager duality structure. According to stewardship theory, more 
regulated firms were more likely to have outsiders on their Boards to reassure 
stakeholders about corporate performance. 
Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory was developed by Freeman in 1984, providing a significant 
contribution to both modem financial management and corporate governance. The 
American Law Institute (1992) defined stakeholder groups to include employees, 
customers, suppliers, and community members with legitimate concerns about a 
corporation (Freeman, 1994). Building upon Freeman's stakeholder theory, Hill and 
Jones (1992) and Blair (1995) explained that there is a contract between managers and 
stakeholders in certain aspects of firm. Stakeholders enforce and monitor company 
managers to create maximum wealth for stakeholders, and this behavior positively 
interacts between manager and stakeholders to create win-win situation. 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Jackson (2003) developed a model to explain the impact of investor decisions on 
corporate performance. This model includes two concepts: internal and external ' 
conditions. Internal conditions refer to the training and education of those who use such 
information. External conditions refer to the economic environment and regulations or 
rules (Jackson, 2003). 
The model of corporate social responsibility was developed by Epstein in 1987 to 
examine corporate social responsibility and corporate performance (Epstein, 1987). Ross 
(2000) and Waring and Lewer (2002) extended this model to assert that positive social 
responsibility by a corporation will attract investor interest. 
EfJicient Market Hypothesis 
An important and famous theory is Fama's Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). 
This model is widely utilized in financial markets and it describes markets as having 
three efficiency categories: strong efficiency, semi-strong efficiency, and weak efficiency 
(Chen, 1999; Sarno & Thornton, 2004). Timely information disclosures are positively 
motivating the stock market toward efficiency (Malkiel, 1992; Sarno et al., 2004). 
Building upon previous work, Jackson (2003) developed a model of internal and 
external conditions to explain efficient markets. There are two groups in this model, an 
experts group and an average investor group. The experts goup usually translates and 
analyzes information for the average investor group in the stock market. The average 
investor group acts when it receives advice provided by the expert group. This model 
provides additional valuable explanations for market efficiency. 
Reasoned Action Theory 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) developed the seminal theory for the prediction of 
human behavior intentions. This theory integrates physiological, psychological, and 
behavioral systems. They explained their reasoned action model in that humans often 
organize their behavior by intention (the original determination in their mind) and 
transfer this determination to their action. Burnkrant and Page (1988) extended the 
reasoned action model to apply to business. They asserted that there is a positive 
relationship between corporate performance and investor behavior. In support of reasoned 
action theory, Gillett & Uddin, (2002) explained that corporate attitudes and investor 
attitudes are expected to be strongly correlated. A positive corporate attitude will directly 
motivate investors' attitudes as well as affect their behavior and actions in the stock 
market. Negative corporate attitudes may lead investors to reconsider a stock's inclusion 
in their portfolios. 
Empirical Literature 
Financial Information Transparency 
In 2004, Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos published a study that examined the 
American insurance industry with respect to signaling theory and financial information 
transparency. They found that corporate wealth had a significant positive relationship 
on a company's stock repurchase announcement in the open market, and that regulations 
and monitoring have positively reduced the degree of information asymmetry between 
insurers and investors when compared to non-regulated industries. The implication is that 
improving corporate governance can lead to improved information asymmetry between 
insurers and investors. 
Chiang's 2005 study of 225 Taiwanese high-tech industry firms found that 
corporate transparency has a significant positive relationship on a company's operating 
performance. His conclusion is that improving corporate governance can lead to 
improved corporate performance, and outsiders' comfort with information provided by 
company leaders for investment decision supports theories of transparency. 
Financial Information Disclosure Requirements 
In 2001, Gelb and Strawer published a study that examined 223 American 
publicly traded firms with respect to information disclosure and financial information 
transparency. Their findings are that both corporate social responsibility and financial 
disclosure have a significant relationship on investor concern. This led to the conclusion 
that companies with disclosure quality will positively maintain investor relationships. 
In 2003, Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier published a study that examined 100 
American publicly traded firms with respect to financial information disclosure and 
corporate governance. Their findings are that audit committee performance does have a 
significant positive relationship with corporate governance and financial disclosure. This 
led to the conclusion that companies with strong audit committee performance will 
improve corporate governance. The implication is that improving corporate governance 
can lead to improved corporate performance, and outsiders can more comfortably rely on 
information provided by the company to make investment decision. 
Agency Theory 
In 2000, Shaw, Gupta, and Delery published a study that examined the United 
States' trucking industry with respect to agency theory. They concluded that when 
stakeholders more closely monitor the company, there are positive influences on the 
compensation system in the trucking industry. 
In 2003, RandOy, Down, and Jenssen published a study that examined maritime 
firms in Sweden and Norway with respect to agency theory and corporate governance. 
They found that Board independence was associated with better firm performance which 
led to the conclusion that board independence has a significant positive relationship with 
financial performance and corporate governance. The implication is that improving board 
independence can lead to improved financial performance and corporate performance, 
and outsiders can comfortably rely on information provided by company leaders to make 
investment decision. 
Trailer, Rechner, and Hill (2004) conducted a study about agency theory to 
examine public-private partnerships and test agency theory in the United States. Their 
findings are that agency problems exist in the public-private partnerships. They 
concluded that a public organization has a responsibility to its own agent and also needs 
to ensure the best interests of its customers. There are a significant number of empirical 
studies supporting agency theories. 
Stewardship Model 
In 2003, Desai, Kroll, and Wright published a study that examined American 
manufacturing firms with respect to stewardship theory and acquisition announcements. 
Their findings are that outsider board participation positively related to acquisition firm 
performance in the presence of CEO duality. These findings led to the conclusion that 
independent leadership structures are more beneficial for acquisition performance. The 
implication is that in the presence of CEO duality, monitoring through the outside Board 
of Directors is another way to ensure owner-interested action. Desai, Kroll, and Wright's 
findings support stewardship theory. 
In 2004, Leng's study about Malaysian publicly traded companies also supported 
stewardshp theory by finding that corporate governance has a significant positive 
relationship on a company's financial performance. These findings led to the conclusion 
that companies with some quality corporate governance leads to better financial 
performance. The implication is that improving corporate governance can lead to 
improved financial performance, and outsiders can comfortably rely on information 
provided by company leaders to make investment decision. 
Stakeholder Model 
In 1999, Luoma and Goodstein published a study that examined U.S. publicly 
traded firms with respect to stakeholder theory and corporate performance. They found 
that the Board of Directors structure has a significant relationship with highly regulated 
industries and organizational size. Their findings led to the conclusion that highly 
regulated industries and larger corporations have greater proportions of stakeholder 
directors on their Boards to monitor corporate performance. 
In 2003, Rib-Belkaoui published a study that examined American 
manufacturing and service firms with respect to stakeholder theory and corporate 
governance. His findings were that intellectual capital has a significant positive 
relationship on financial performance and that improving intellectual capital governance 
can lead to organizational wealth creation. 
Dimovski and Skerlavaj's 2004 study examining Slovenian publicly traded 
companies found a significant positive relationship between information communication 
. .technology and firm financial performance. These studies all support stakeholder 
theory. 
Corporate SocialResponsibility 
In 2003, McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd published a study that examined U.S. 
publicly traded firms with respect to corporate social responsibility and corporate 
performance. Their findings that corporate governance had a significant positive 
relationship on corporate social performance led to the conclusion that improving 
corporate governance can lead to improved corporate social performance, stimulating 
interest by institutional investors. 
In 2003, Snider, Hill & Martin examined global and U.S. publicly traded firms to 
find that both sets of organizations concentrated on similar sets of stakeholders and 
corporate social responsibility issues. They concluded that the most successhl U.S. and 
overseas firms concentrate more on corporate social responsibility than less successll 
firms do. The implication is that improving corporate social responsibility can lead to 
improved corporate performance. 
Flouris and Walker's 2005 study examined the American aviation industry with 
respect to investor confidence model and financial performance. Their findings that 
positive financial performance, in particular, profitability is attractive to investors and 
that improving financial performance can lead to more interested investors and regained 
market confidence support investor confidence theory, 
EfJicient Market Hypothesis 
In 2004, Fraser published a study that examined American and Japanese investors 
with respect to efficient market hypothesis model and their expectations. Her findings 
were that stock market efficiency has a significant relationship with investor expectation 
which led to the conclusion that investor expectations will increase with efficient stock 
markets. Improving corporate governance and stock market efficiency can lead - to 
increased investor expectations. 
Christopherson and Greqoriou's 2004 study found that there is negative 
relationship between high-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's return, and there is a 
positive relationship between low-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's return. This led 
to the conclusion that Berkshire's returns can be predicted not only from value stocks but 
also from mid cap growth stocks, supporting the efficient market hypothesis. 
Reasoned Action Theory 
Uddin and Gillett's 2002 study supported reasoned action theory by finding that 
high moral reasoners are more influenced than low moral reasoners by their own attitude 
towards a specific behavior. Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary's 2003 study about U.S. 
recently IPO'ed high-technology firms also supported reasoned action theory in its 
findings that firm internationalization has a significant positive relationship with top 
management's global experience. 
Theoretical Framework for the Study 
The major theories that guide this study consist of signaling theory developed by 
Spence (1973), and reasoned action theory developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). The, 
theoretical literature begins with the concept of financial information transparency, 
corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, market efficiency, and investor 
behavior, which is the major area for this study. The theoretical literature emphasizes two 
major afenas- financial information transparency and investor perception.. A schematic 
model (seeFigure 1) depicts the relationships among the major theories and variables in 
this study. 
Figure 1: Schematic model of variables in this study. 
The gap in this literature review is that there is little empirical research to support 
the relationship between financial information transparency and investor behavior, 
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especially in the Taiwan stock market. Therefore, additional study in this area is needed 
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Board Structure 
to discover if greater financial transparency is positively correlated with improved 
Experience Investor behavior 
investor confidence and investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market. In order to fill this 
gap, the researcher explored the relationship between financial information transparency 
and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock Market. The results of this-study may have 
contributions for corporations, investors, and other researchers. Chapter 3 presents the 
methodology used to answer the research question and explanatory hypothesis. 
CHAPTER 111 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
Chapter three presents a description of the methodology for this study, which 
focuses upon the impact of financial information transparency on investor behavior. The 
research questions and hypotheses which appear in Chapter I and Chapter I11 evolve from 
gaps in the literature. The main purpose of this study is to assess stock market investors' . 
feelings, thoughts, and attitudes about the financial information transparency. 
Research Design 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The aim of this study is to explore the key factors that explain the impact of 
financial information transparency on investor behavior in Taiwanese companies that are 
listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSEC). This research study proposes a theoretical 
framework based on the modified theory of Gillett and Uddin's study (2002) that includes 
corporate governance and corporate performance to explain how financial information 
transparency may influence investor behavior. 
Research Questions 
The major research questions that were addressed by this study are as follows: 
1. Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of 
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock 
Market? 
2. Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of 
financial information transparency according to demographic variables? 
3. Are there differences in TSEC investor behavior according to different 
categories of investor experience? 
Hypothesis 
The following hypothesis guided the research of this study: 
H TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions, 
investor demographic, and investor experience are significant explanatory 
variables of investor behavior in the TSEC. 
In order to answer the research questions and test the hypothesis, the research 
focused on eight independent variables and one dependent variable. 
Quantitative Method Approach 
The five research questions lead to the development of a non-experimental survey 
research study. The research design employed a mixed method approach using 19 
closed-ended questions, plus one open-ended question on a survey instrument. Baker 
(1999) declared that quantitative research seeks to establish facts, make predictions, and 
test hypotheses that have already been stated. Babbie (2002) defined the difference 
between qualitative and quantitative data as, "quantitative data are numerical data; 
qualitative data are not." (p.39). Anderson and Kanuka (2003) explained that quantitative 
methods allow researchers using a variety of mathematical techniques to investigate the 
relationship between the data in descriptions, correlations, significant differences, or 
multivariate relationships. Analysis is the process that attempts to find answers from 
collecting data. 
Due to the character of quantitative research, certain types of research that study 
the preferences, practices, attitudes, or interests of some groups of people are more likely 
to be carried out by this method, rather than the methods involved in qualitative research 
(Creswell, 2002). Generally speaking, the aim of quantitative research methodology is to 
determine whether a particular population shares certain characteristics in common. 
Depnition of Terms 
There are a total of nine variables used in this study, which include one dependent 
variable and eight independent variables. The definitions of each variable are as follows: 
Independent variables: 
Demographic variables: 
Age: In this research study, age is divided into four groups: 18-30 years, 31-45 
years, 46-60 years, and more than 60. 
Gender: In this research study, gender is divided into two groups: males and 
females. 
Education level: In this research study, education level is divided into four groups: 
high school degree or under, 2 years college degree, Bachelors degree, and 
Masters degree or above. 
Annual income: In this research study, annual income is divided into four groups: 
less than 10,000 USD, 10,000 to 25,000 USD, 25,001 to 35,000 USD, and 
more than 35,000 USD. 
Experience of buying shares: In this research study, buying shares experience is 
divided into three groups: less than 4 years experience, 4 to 9 years experience, and more 
than 9 years experience. 
Financial information transparency (FIT): The financial information transparency 
measurement criteria were divided by S&P in transparency of ownership structure, 
investor relations, financial transparency, information disclosure, and board structure. 
There were 98 criteria with 98 points in five categories, and one point was awarded to 
each company that met the criteria (S&P's company, 2002, Chiang, 2005). Based on 
abovementioned descriptions, the researcher defined FIT in this study as: FIT is the 
persuasion of investors by using logic in the stock market. This study focuses on annual 
reports and corporation websites, such as Botosan (1997) stated "Although the annual 
report is one means of corporate reporting, it should serve as a good proxy for the level 
voluntary disclosure provided by a firm across all disclosure avenues. This is because 
annual report disclosure levels are positively correlated with the amount of disclosure 
provided via other media (Lang, and Lundholm, (1 993)). The annual report is the focus of 
my disclosure index because the annual report is generally considered to be one of the 
most important sources of corporate information."(p.323). 
Sub-independent variables: 
Financial information transparency (FIT): there are three sub-variables under FIT 
(ownership structure and investor relations, financial transparency 'and information 
disclosure, and Board and management structure and process): 
1. Ownership structure and investor relations (OSIR): Understanding the 
ownership- structure of the company is essential, especially when there is a 
known majority holder or when the majority holdings may exist ontthe basis of 
collusive shareholding arrangements. Similarly, the existence of a large number 
of nominee shareholders will make any analysis of the concentration of share 
ownership difficult. The researcher defined ownership structure and investor 
relations in this study as: the number of transparency criteria of ownership and 
investor's relations / total numbers of transparency criteria of ownership and 
investor's relations. 
2. Financial transparency and information disclosure (FTID): Transparency 
involves the timely disclosure of adequate information concerning a company's 
operating and financial performance and its corporate governance practice. For 
a well-governed company, standards of timely disclosure and transparency are 
high. The researcher defined FTID in this study as: the number of transparency 
criteria of financial transparency and information disclosure / total number of 
transparency criteria of financial transparency and information disclosure. 
3. Board and management structure and process (BMSP): Board structure and 
process addresses the role of the corporate Board and its ability to provide 
independent oversight of management performance and hold management 
accountable to shareholder and other relevant stakeholders. The researcher 
defined BMSP in this study as: the number of transparency criteria of Board and 
management structure and process 1 total number of transparency criteria of 
Board and management structure and process. 
Dependent Variable 
Investor Behavior: 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) developed the seminal theory for the prediction of 
human behavior intentions. This theory integrates physiological, psychological, and 
behavioral systems. They explained their reasoned action model in that humans often 
organize their behavior by intention (the original determination in their mind) and 
transfer this determination to their action. Donaldsom and Davis (1994) extended the 
reasoned action model to apply to business. They asserted that there is a positive 
relationship between corporate performance and investor behavior. In support of reasoned 
action theory, Uddin and Gillett, (2002) explained that corporate attitudes and investor 
attitudes are expected to be strongly correlated. A positive corporate attitude will directly 
motivate investors' attitudes as well as affect their behavior and actions in the stock 
market. Negative corporate attitudes may lead investors to reconsider a stock's inclusion 
in their portfolios. 
According to these definitions of each variable above, the research design will 
include an appropriate closed-end 1 to 9 Likert scale of survey questions to evaluate the 
relationships among the variables. These variables will be measured using an Investment 
Behavior Questionnaire, developed by the researcher. 
Procedure 
All procedures of this study were described in explicit terms so that other 
researchers will be able to replicate the study. For this study, the researcher defined the 
research questions to be answered, and than designed an appropriate questionnaire to 
measure all of the variables. The content validity of the questionnaire will be based on a 
review of relevant literature, and incorporation of ideas from dissertation committee 
members. 
The criterion for selection in this study is that only the respondents who have 
previous experience with buying shares in TSEC will be included in this survey. 
Participation in this survey was completely voluntary. Participants could withdraw from 
the survey at any time without specifying the reasons. The aim of this survey was to help 
the researcher to identify the critical factors that may explain the impact of financial 
information transparency on investor behavior in Taiwan Stock Exchange. 
The research study employed the following procedures to conduct this 
investigation: 
1. This research used closed-end questions with 1 to 9 Likert scale response 
designed for every question in the questionnaire. Survey instructions to 
participants were as follows: In answering all of the questions, the respondents 
were requested to use a scale from 1 to 9 where 1 means" very strongly 
disagree", 5 means "neither agree nor disagree", and 9 means "very strongly 
agree". Write a number in the space provided that best indicates respondents' 
feeling about the question. 
2. The research includes one open-ended question, at the end of questionnaire, to 
ensure that respondents had the full opportunity to express their comments and 
suggestions for this survey. 
3. As all respondents were Chinese, the questionnaire was translated from English 
into Chinese by using the reverse-translation method with an official 
endorsement from an expert who is fluent in both the Chinese and English 
languages to ensure the consistency of the questionnaire. ?'he certificate letter 
for the translation of questionnaire is provided. 
4. Current research protocols require that all dissertation designs must be 
approved by the University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) for research 
concerning human subjects. After the study was approved by the Lynn 
University Institutional Review Board (IRB), this survey was conducted with 
investors in TSEC. 
5. This survey selected investors from the stock market in Taiwan. This 
questionnaire collected quantitative data from investors who have experience 
with buying shares at TSEC in Taiwan. 
6. The whole procedure of responding to this survey is totally anonymous. The 
conduct of this survey took approximately one week, from December 12, 2005 
to December 18,2005. There was no compensation offered to study volunteers. 
This research intended to recruit a minimum of 300 participants, based on the 
principle that a valid statistical analysis will need to look for about 5 to 10 
responses in each of the major sub-categories of the sample for this study. 
7. After getting all responses from participants, the researcher developed a 
database structure which integrated the data for this study. The researcher will 
keep all theinformation that participants provided completely confidential. 
8. The statistical techniques for data analysis include descriptive, correlation, 
independent sample t-test, one-way ANOVA analysis, and multiple regression 
analyses. For this study, the level of confidence indicating statistical 
significance was p .05. The procedures were as follows: (1) the data was 
analyzed in a standard SPSS statistical program and a simple descriptive 
analysis was run. (2) the study used correlation analysis to examine the 
relationship between variables. (3) multiple regression analysis was used to 
interpret relationships among variables. 
9. Finally, the researcher will interpret and discuss the results of all the data 
analyses, and make conclusions and recommendations for the study. 
Ethics 
Ehca l  behavior in educational research is in large part a personal matter, and 
researchers have the ethical responsibility to protect the anonymity of participants 
(Creswell, 2002). Babbie (1991) stated "the fundamental ethical rule of social research is 
that it brings no harm to research subjects." (p.38). 
In this study, the survey was distributed by the researcher to those who have 
previous experience with investing or buying shares in companies listed on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange. In order to address ethical issues, a brief introduction was included in 
the beginning of the questionnaire to explain the purpose of this research to participants, 
and offer respondents an extended opportunity to ask questions. 
The potential participants were approached by the researcher outside of an 
underwriter's office and were provided with an explanation of the research. If they were 
interested in participating, they were provided an Informed Consent letter, and 
questionnaire. By completing the survey, the participant gave their consents. When the 
survey was completed by the participants, the researcher collected the questionnaires. The , 
participants did not write any identifier on the questionnaire and no one can identify the 
respondents from this survey. Participation in this survey was totally voluntary, they 
could stop answering the questions or withdraw in the survey at any time. The whole 
process of participation in this survey was completely anonymous and voluntary. A 
participant was not requested to mention or write hisher name on the questionnaire. 
Therefore, there is no way for the researcher to know who provided the responses. The 
whole procedure was to guarantee respondents' anonymity and they were free to 
discontinue participation at any time. 
In this survey, human rights and data protection regulation are guaranteed by the 
researcher. Confidentiality of survey data will be maintained and stored in the 
researcher's personal database pool. The data will be saved no longer than one year from 
when the study is completed and no one can access the researcher's personal database 
pool except the researcher. 
Instrumentation 
Introduction 
One instrument was used for the collection of the questionnaire data: The Investor 
Behavior Questionnaire, which includes a demographic profile (see Appendix A), 
developed by the researcher. There were a total of 20 questions. An Information and 
Informed Consent Statement for Participants also explained the purpose of the study and 
the aim of this survey to potential participants. The researcher conducted this survey 
using a sample of investors who have previous experience with buying shares in TSEC. 
The demographic profile portion of the questionnaire was constructed by the 
researcher, and was intended to provide background information on each individual in the 
study. The questionnaire asked for information such as: age, gender, and highest level of 
education. The demographic statistics enabled the researcher to examine the impact of 
demographic characteristics of the investors on their investment behavior. A survey with 
a closed-ended 1 to 9 Likert scale questionnaire was developed and employed to rate the 
impact of an information transparency on investor behavior. 
Rationale of Selecting Instrument 
Baker (1999) explained survey research as: "a research method that analyzes the 
responses of defined sample to a set of questions measuring attitudes and behaviors." 
(p.505). Babbie (1991) identified that a survey design is to provide a quantitative or 
numeric description of attitudes, opinions, or trends of a population by investigating a 
sample of the population. Surveys represent one of the most common types of 
quantitative, social science research. The objective of a survey is to employ 
questionnaires or interviews to gather data from a sample that has been chosen to 
demonstrate a population to which the findings of the data analysis may be generalized 
(Anderson & Kanuka, 2003). 
The major benefit of survey research is that it presents all subjects with a 
standardized stimulus, and can eliminate to a large degree unreliability in the researcher's 
observations (Anderson & Kanuka, 2003). On the other hand, the disadvantage of survey 
research is that researchers must develop questions general enough for all respondents. 
However, it is not possible to deal with the context, under which the respondents make 
their choices (Babbie 1991). 
Development of the Questionnaire 
Questionnaires are employed widely in educational research to gather data about 
phenomena that are not easily observable. Dillman (2000) explained that when designing 
a survey, a researcher has to make decisions such as whether they would like to employ 
an oral or written method, and whether they prefer open or close-ended questions. 
Questionnaire methodology is to ask the same questions to all participants in the sample. 
Participants write down a response to each questionnaire item (Babbie 1991). In this 
study, the researcher will employ a questionnaire method and choose close-ended 
questions along with one open-ended question. 
The purpose of writing a survey is to develop a written set of questions for the 
respondents, and make every participant interpret these questions in the same way 
(Babbie 1991). Researchers need to be careful with regard to the type, content, wording, 
and order of the questions that are included in a questionnaire (Dillman, 2000). 
There are several reasons for the researcher to select a questionnaire type of 
survey design in this study. 
1. The cost of survey questionnaires is relatively lower than through a one-to -one 
interview process. 
2. Standardized questions can help the researcher make precise measurements and 
results which are easy to interpret by statistical analysis. 
3. The time required to gather the data is less than resorting to the interview 
technique. 
4. Many questions can be asked about a given topic and a large sample size is 
possible. 
Many factors need to be considered when creating a questionnaire. This research 
followed four procedures (determine the questions to ask, select the question format, 
design the wording of questions, determine the order of questions), proposed by Fong 
(2004), to build a valid questionnaire instrument: 
1. Determine the Questions to Ask: The aim of this study was to investigate the 
critical factor of financial information transparency that effects investor 
behavior in the Taiwanese Stock Exchange. This study was interested in 
analyzing investor attitudes and perceptions about information transparency 
using a classic reasoned action theory approach. The questions helped this 
research study to successhlly obtain the answers of its research inquiries. In 
addition, questions should be precise, and not ambiguous in order to receive 
specific feedback from participants. Therefore, this questionnaire was expected 
to complete the purpose of this study. 
2. Select the Question Format: A questionnaire can be either open form or closed 
form. It depends on the objective of the question. The researcher decided to use 
closed-ended questions with a 1 to 9 Likert scale response for each question in 
the questionnaire. In this research also was included one open-ended question at 
the end of survey to collect qualitative data. There are three techniques . 
employed in designing the questionnaire, there are closed-ended question, 1 to 9 
Likert scale, and one open-ended question. The purpose of selecting this 
questionnaire format was to obtain a wider range of replies from participants. . 
3. Design the wording of questions: The general rule is to keep questions as 
simple and straightforward as possible (Fong, 2004). The researcher also 
considered the following rules to create the wording of questions: (1) avoid 
biased or leading questions, (2) avoid double-barreled questions, (3) avoid 
questions involving confusion, ambiguity, and negatives, (4) avoid questions 
involving personal privacy, and (5) avoid asking questions that are beyond the 
scope of the study. 
4. Determine the Order of Questions: Burgess (2001) stated that questionnaires 
should be kept logical and short. Illogically-ordered and longer questionnaires 
may result in lower response rates. In this research, the researcher kept the 
questionnaires logical, short, and easy for respondents. The purpose of this 
design is to improve response rates by easy-to -answer formats and 
respondent-friendly questionnaire. The researcher also arranged similar 
questions together for participants replying to the questionnaire. Additionally, in 
order to avoid participants feeling uncomfortable with providing personal 
information to strangers at first, the researcher placed demographic questions 
near the end of the questionnaire. 
Construction of the Questionnaire 
The survey used for this study is based on the Reasoned Action Theory. The 
questionnaire included an Information and Informed Consent Statement and an Investor ' 
Behavior Questionnaire developed by the researcher (see Appendix A). The Information 
and Informed Consent Statement includes a brief explanation of the objective of the 
survey, the confidentiality of respondents' infornlation, and instructions on completing 
the survey. The researcher's personal contact information was offered to assure 
respondents that they could ask questions or request further information about this 
research study. 
The questionnaire is composed of 20 questions. Questions 1 to 14 pertained 
directly to the influence of three elements (financial information transparency, social 
responsibility and investor behavior) in the Taiwan Stock Market. There are a total of 
nine questions for financial information transparency and disclosure, one question for 
corporate social responsibility and four questions for investor behavior. Questions 11 to 
14 are designed to survey investor behavior of the sample. Questions 15 to 19 are 
directed to the participants' demographic information, such as: gender, age, education 
level, attending stock market experience, and annual income. The last question is an 
open-ended question. It allowed respondents to write down additional comments, and 
suggestions, and any relevant issues that were not mentioned in the questionnaire. The 
questions were divided as follows: 
Transparency of Ownership questions: 1,2, and 3. 
Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure questions: 4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,  and 8. 
Board Structure and Process question: 9. 
Corporate Social Responsibility question: 10. 
Corporate Scandals questions: 11, 12, and 13. 
Government Regulatory question: 14. 
Demographic questions: 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19. 
An open-ended question: 20. 
Response Rate 
The research study process requires a high participation rate in a sample selected 
from a population to assure the possibility that bias is less likely. The following strategies 
were conducted to enhance the response rate for this study: 
1. Meeting with an expert to enhance the validity of the questionnaire. 
2. Make sure all questions avoid problems with wording. 
3. Ensure questions are easy and clear for participants to answer. 
4. Employ the convenience sampling method to select the sample. 
5. Visit local underwriters and institutions agencies to encourage they invite 
participants to join k s  survey. 
Reliability and Validity 
Backer (1999) stated that reliability has to build upon the accuracy and quality of 
measurement. Therefore, the issue of reliability deals with the question of whether this 
instrument will design the same finding each time the survey is processed to the same 
participants in the same situation. However, Borg and Gall (1983) stated validity means 
"in testing, the appropriateness, meaningfulness, and usehlness of specific inferences 
made from test scores." (p.733). Therefore, validity is concerned about the study's 
achievement in measuring what the researcher set out to measure and reliability is 
concerned about the precision of the actual measuring or procedure instrument. 
This study employed the following strategies to ensure the reliability and validity 
of this research. 
1. Quantitative research method: This research is conducted through a quantitative 
research method to create the reliability and validity of the study. The results in 
a quantitative research method are based on large sample sizes. Therefore this 
research used a large enough sample of participants to provide meaningful data 
that rely on statistical procedures. 
2. A questionnaire type of survey: This study utilized a structural research 
instrument - a questionnaire type of survey to enhance the reliability and 
validity of the study. A questionnaire survey can be asked about a specified 
topic in many questions. This type of survey provides great flexibility to the 
researcher in the data analysis. 
3. Work with dissertation committee members: The researcher worked with the 
dissertation chair and committee members who are the experts in this topical 
area to ensure the validity of the study. The researcher edited the study 
questionnaire by meeting with the dissertation chair prior to the study. A 
meeting with an expert helped the researcher to develop better questions and 
adapt questions for final participants to answer. 
Another method used to ensure the reliability of this study was to conduct a rating 
format in the design of the questionnaire. The researcher used a survey questionnaire with 
a closed-ended 1 to 9 Likert scale to ask participants the extent to which they agree or 
disagree. Each question was designed to illicit a numerical value fiom 1 to 9. The 
researcher's bias was eliminated through a standardized format that is presented to all 
respondents. Higher reliability also could be obtained fiom this standardized format. 
Population and Sampling Plan 
Target andAccessible Population 
A sample population is used due to researchers being unable to access all 
members of the population. Investigating an entire population who are associated with a 
study is almost impossible. Sometimes this kind of problem is due to limitations in time, 
money or other resources (Babbie, 2002; Black, 1999). 
Certain sampling methods are designed to increase the validity of study findings. 
Researchers had to ensure that a large percentage of the chosen sample population will 
respond. On the other hand, the statistical significance of the relationships among the 
variables may be higher if the researchers have a high participation rate in a sample 
selected from a population. 
In this study, the target population was investors who have experience buying 
shares of companies listed on TSEC. There are approximately 3 million investors trading 
securities in the TSEC. The accessible population was limited to investors prior to their 
entry into the security brokers and dealers. This study employed the convenience 
sampling method to select the sample. Respondents were selected by a random sampling 
method. The reason to select this sampling,method in the study is: the convenience 
sampling method is the most economical, time-efficient, and feasible method for the 
researcher. On the other hand, the random sampling method can increase the validity of 
this study but also can avoid the bias by researchers (Creswell, 2002). 
Eligibility Criteria 
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of financial information 
transparency on investor behavior in Taiwan. For that reason, the eligibility criteria for 
this study are: 
1 .  The geographic area and setting was limited to a public area, near the 
entrance to one underwriter in Taiwan. 
2. Investors agreed to participate in this study and to complete a 
questionnaire. 
3. Investors were able to read, write, and speak Chinese, were 18 years or 
older. 
4. Investors must have had experience investing in the TSEC. 
5. The questionnaire was translated from English into Chinese by using 
the reverse-translation method with an official endorsement from an 
expert who is fluent in both the Chinese and English languages to 
ensure the consistency of the questionnaire. 
Systematic Sample (Probability) 
The sample was selected from investors who have experience in TSEC, using 
systematic sampling, a probability sampling plan. The using of systematic sampling is 
commonly used in research in which large populations are studied. Systematic sampling 
is "sampling in which individuals are selected from a list by taking every K name" (Gay, 
1996. p. 122). The process of systematic sampling of subjects was choosing investors who 
departed the underwriter as they finished their businesses. 
Data Collection 
A questionnaire was used to collect data from those who have previous experience 
with buying shares in corporations listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Quantitative 
data was collected using 19 closed-ended questions with 1 to 9 Likert scales, ranging 
from very strongly disagree to very strongly agree ( I  = very strongly disagree, 5= neither 
agree nor disagree, 9= very strongly agree). Before conducting the survey, meeting with 
an expert helped to improve the reliability and validily of the questionnaire. This research 
study planned to recruit 300 respondents to participate in the survey. The researcher 
selected investors from those who registered with the underwriters in Taiwan. This 
questionnaire collected quantitative data from investors who have experience with buying 
shares at TSEC and at least 18 years old in Taiwan. The researcher stood outside of the 
underwriter office to look for investors who met the requirements and were willing to be 
a participant. After obtaining replies from the respondents, the researcher created a 
database file that integrated the variables for the study, and then entered the collected data 
into an SPSS statistical program. 
Data Analysis 
Introduction 
The study used statistical methods to analyze the impact of financial information 
transparency and corporate governance on investor behavior. This research followed five 
major steps, proposed by Fong (2004), in the conduct of a study: 
1. Structuring the data for analysis and validity measurement 
2. Verifying the data 
3. Describing the data (descriptive statistics) 
4. Determining the relationships between variables (correlation analysis) 
5. Examining the relationship among the independent variables and dependent 
variable (multiple regression analysis) 
Following the above steps, data was collected and entered into an SPSS program. 
for statistical analysis. Reliability was determined by Cronbach's Alpha (a) Reliability. 
Correlation analysis was used to determine the relationship between variables. If there is 
a strong positive relationship between two variables the correlation coefficient will be 
close to +l. 0, and if there is a strong negative relationship between two variables the 
correlation coefficient will tend toward to -1. 0. Finally, this study employed a multiple 
regression analysis to determine relationships among the variables. Multiple regression 
analysis presents the important degree of influence of two or more independent variables 
on a single dependent variable. 
Methods of Data Analysis 
Five different statistical analyses were used in this study (descriptive statistics, 
correlation analysis, independent-samples t-test analysis, one-way ANOVA analysis, 
multiple regression analysis). 
1. Descriptive statistics: Descriptive statistics are designed to achieve information 
concerning the distribution of variables (Creswell, 2002). After data was 
collected, the researcher ran the sample descriptive statistics in a standard SPSS 
program to interpret the validity on data status in this study. The frequency 
distribution of discrete variables (gender, level of education, buying shares 
experience, and annual income) was checked by the researcher. Further, the 
frequency distribution of continuous independent and dependent variables was 
analyzed with histograms. 
2. Correlation analysis: Correlation analysis was used to develop a simple 
correlation between two continuous variables (Creswell, 2002). The researcher 
employed correlation analysis to examine the relationships between the 
independent variables to ensure that all independent variables are independent 
of each other. The researcher also conducted correlation analysis to examine the 
relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable to 
measure whether the research questions in this study are supported. 
3. Independent samples t-test analysis: The t-test is used to compare the values of 
the means from two different samples. A t-test determines if the means of the 
two sample distributions vary significantly from each other (Creswell, 2002). In 
this study, independent sample t-test analysis was used to examine the 
independent and dependent variables to determine whether there is a different 
tendency among participants according to the demographic variable of gender. 
4. One-way ANOVA analysis: One-way ANOVA analysis is designed to measure 
the relationship between one dependent variable and multiple independent 
variables. This is different .from the t-test analysis which compares only two 
distributions. One-way ANOVA analysis can compare two or more independent 
variables (Creswell, 2002). In this study, one-way ANOVA analysis was 
employed to examine whether there are any statistical differences between 
diverse experience groups in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Experience was 
divided into three groups: less than 4 years, 4-9 years, and more than 9 years, 
which were coded numerically as 1, 2, and 3. In one-way ANOVA analysis, 
the researcher explored whether there are significant differences within any of 
the comparisons of the three groups in the sample. 
5. Multiple regression analysis: Regression analysis is designed to measure a 
linear relationship between variables. It can be used to calculate the values of a 
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. The results 
presented by multiple regression analysis are four main values: 
R2: The R value indicates the strength of the relationship between the dependent 
variable and independent variables. The square of R indicates the extent of the 
variance of the dependent variable that is explained by the set of independent 
variables. The R value ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, 0.0 means no relationship. The 
larger the value of R, the better (Creswell, 2002). 
F statistic: The F statistic represents a probability value that the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the set of independent variables could have 
happened by chance (Creswell, 2002). 
Beta weight: The Beta weight indicates the unique contribution of each 
independent variable to explain the dependent variable. Beta weight is similar to 
a correlation coefficient and the value ranges from -1 to $1. Generally spealung, 
the beta weight represents the direction and the strength of the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables (Creswell, 2002). 
t statistic: The t statistic indicates the degree of probability of the relationship 
between each independent variable and dependent variable (Creswell, 2002). In 
this study, multiple regression analysis was used to examine the relationships 
between the independent and dependent variables. 
In this study, the regression equation takes the form as below: 
Y=~(XI,X~,X~,&,XS,X~,X~,X~)+~ 
Where Y = Investor Behavior (Dependent variable) 
XI = OSIR (Independent Variable I), ownership structure and investor 
relations. 
X2 = FTID (Independent Variable 2), financial transparency and 
information disclosure. 
X3 = BMSP (Independent Variable 3), board and management structure 
and process. 
Xq = Gender (Independent Variable 9) 
Xs =Age (Independent Variable 10) 
X6 = Education (Independent Variable 11) 
X7 = Annual income (Independent Variable 12) 
X8 = Experience (Independent Variable 13) 
e = error term 
Summary 
This chapter presents a description of the methodology for this study, whlch 
focuses on the impact of financial information transparency on investor behavior in the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange. The five research questions led to the development of the survey 
of this study with descriptive and exploratory purposes. The research design employed a 
non-experimental, causal-comparative, quantitative method approach. There are 8 
independent variables and 1 dependent variable in this study. The survey uses 19 
closed-ended and one open-ended question in the survey instrument. 
The statistical techniques for data analysis included descriptive statistics, 
correlation analysis, independent sample t-test, one-way ANOVA analysis, and multiple 
regression analysis. A multiple regression analysis was employed to examine the 
relationship among independent and dependent variables. The R square value was used to 
examine the significance of the overall model. The results of this study can make a 
significant contribution to the development of effective corporate governance on investor 
behavior in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to demonstrate how financial information 
transparency factors affect investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market. The major 
independent variable was financial information transparency. Sub-variables for the 
independent variable financial information transparency included ownership structure, 
financial transparency, and board structure. Demographic variables were gender, age, 
education, and income. The last independent variable was investing experience. The 
dependent variable was investor behavior. 
The research conducted a quantitative method approach, using closed-end 
questions on survey instruments. Participants were instructed to indicate how strongly 
they disagreed or agreed with a number of their descriptors and feelings about the impact 
of financial information transparency on investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market. A 
nine point Likert scale was used in the survey (1 = very strongly disagree, 5 neither agree 
nor disagree, 9 = very strongly agree). The survey was distributed by the researcher to 
investors who have experience with buying shares in the Taiwan stock market. Data was 
collected during December of 2005. A total of 305 responses were received by the 
deadline. In general, the study's results indicate the inference of relationships between 
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market. 
This chapter presents the major results assessed from the data collection. Chapter 
four begins with descriptive characteristics of the participants. 'These findings support the 
purpose of the study to answer and test the following research questions and hypothesis 
investigated: 
Research Questions 
1. Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of 
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock 
Market? 
2. Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of 
financial information transparency according to demographic variables? 
3. Are there difference in TSEC investor behavior according to different 
categories of investor experience? 
Hypothesis 
H: TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions, 
investor demographic, and investor experience are significant explanatory 
variables of investor behavior in the TSEC. 
Research methods of data analysis included the descriptive statistic, correlation 
analysis, independent-samples t tests analysis, one-way ANOVA analysis, and multiple 
regression analysis (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2005; SPSS Inc. 2005). 
Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents 
A sample survey in the Taiwan stock market was obtained with an " N  count of 
305. Of the respondents, gender was divided somewhat evenly with 158 (51.8%) males, 
and 147 (48.2%) females. The mean age group for those respondents in the survey was 
2.78 with a standard deviation of 0.87 for four age groups (18-30, 31-45, 46-60, more 
than 60), while 5.6% were between 18 to 30 years old. The median age group was 3. The 
age ranged from 46-60 yeas of age. Figure 2 shows the age distribution of samples in this 
study. 
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Figure 2: The age distribution of samples in this study. 
The divisions of the educational background of respondents were as follows: 
A total of 94 respondents (30.8%) had a high school degree or under, 105 (34.4%) 
had a two years college degree, 70 (23%) had a bachelor degree, and 36 (11.8%) had a 
masters degree or above. Figure 2 shows the educational background distribution of 
samples in this study. 
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Figure 3: The educational background distribution of samples in this study. 
The division of income for respondents was as follows: 
A total of 69 respondents (22.6%) had a less than 10,000 USD, 107 (35.1%) had 
10,000 to 25,000 USD, 63 (20.7%) had 25,001 to 35,000 USD, and 66 (21.6%) had more 
than 35,000 USD. Figure 3 shows the annual income distribution of responses in this 
study. 
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Figure 4: The income distribution of responses in this study. 
Research Question 1 
Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of 
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock Market? 
In order to answer the research question 1, two different statistical analyses were 
employed. They were descriptive analysis and correlation analysis. 
Descriptive Analysis for Questions I 
The report of frequencies count concerning independent variables (i.e., ownership 
structure, financial transparency, board structure) showed that financial transparency had 
the highest mean score of 4.813 (SD = 1.074). Board structure had the second.highest 
mean score of 4.472 (SD =1.886). Ownership structure had the lowest mean score of 
4.031 (SD = 1.268). The dependent variable of investor behavior had a mean score of 
4.617 (SD =1.714). Table 1 below displays the basic descriptive data of ownership 
structure, financial transparency, board structure, and investor behavior. 
Table I 
The Results of Frequencies Ccount for Investor Behavior and Three Independent 
Variables (Ownership Structure, Financial Transparency, Board Structure) N=305 
Mean Std. Error of Median Mode Std. Variable Mean Deviation 
Ownership 4.03 1 .073 4.00 3.50 1.268 
Structure 
Financial 4.813 .061 4.75 5.52 1.074 
Transparency 
Board 4.472 .lo8 5.00 5.00 1.886 
Structure 
Investor 4.617 .098 4.33 4.33 1.714 
Behavior 
Correlation Analysis for Question I 
Correlations analysis was conducted using the Pearson Product Moment 
technique for three continuous independent variables (ownership structure, financial 
transparency, board structure) and one continuous dependent variable (investor behavior). 
The purposes of doing the correlation analysis for research question 1 are that correlation 
analysis can measure if three independent variables (ownership structure, financial 
transparency, board structure) are independent fiom each other and correlation analysis 
can measure if each independent variable has high correlation coefficient with the 
dependent variable (investor behavior). 
As shown in Table 2, all of the correlation coefficients are lower than 35. If the 
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correlation coefficient is higher than 35, they the variables are not independent from each 
other. Therefore, the three independent variables (ownership structure, financial 
transparency, board structure) were independent fiom each other. , 
Table 2 
The Results of Pearson Correlation Coeficients among the ~nde~enden't Variablq 
(Ownership Structure, Financial Transparency, Board Structure) N=305 . . 
Variable Ownership Financial Board 
Structure Transparency Structure 
Ownership 1 .430** .797** 
Structure(~earson Correlation) 
Financial (Pearson Correlation) .430** 1 .432** 
Transparency 
Board (Pearson Correlation) .797** .432** 1 
Structure 
*p = < .05 **p = < .01 ***p =< .001 
A correlation coefficient is a number that indicates the degree of relationship 
between variables. The value of the correlation coefficient ranges from -1.0 to +1.0. A 
positive correlation (1 > r > 0) means two variables have a positive relationship. On the 
other hand, a negative correlation (-1 < r < 0) means two variables have negative 
relationship. As shown in Table 3, the coefficients are positive (1 .> r > 0) and are 
statistically significant different at p = <.01 level between independent variables 
(ownership structure, financial transparency, board structure) and investor behavior in the 
Taiwan stock market. 
The Results of Pearson Correlation Analysis for Investor Behavior and Independent 
Variables (Ownership Structure, Financial - Transparency, Board Structure) N-305 
Variable Ownership Financial Board 
Structure Transparency Structure 
- .  
Investor Behavior 
(Pearson Correlation) .837** .632** .848** 
In general, investor behavior had a strong positive correlation to the independent 
variables (ownership structure, financial transparency, board structure). The correlation 
between investor behavior and independent variables was statistically significant at the p 
= < .O1 level, which means they had a strong positive relationship. This number 
represents that as the value of one independent variable increases, the value of the 
dependent variable (investor behavior) also tends to increase. This result illustrates that 
corporations enhancing ownership structure, financial transparency, and board structure 
can improve relationships with investors. 
Research Question 2 
Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of financial 
information transparency according to demographic variables? In order to answer 
research question 2, descriptive statistics, independent-samples t test analysis and 
ANOVOA were utilized. The independent-samples t test can compare the means of two 
different groups such as females and males. ANOVA can compare three or more groups 
in the study. 
Descriptive and Independent-Sample t Test Analysis for Question 2 
The data sample consists of 305 respondents who completed the survey; including 
158 (51.8%) males, and 147 (48.2%) females. Gender is a nominal variable. It was taken 
on two values, males .and females in the survey, which were coded numerically as 1 and 2. 
Table 4 displays the mean scores for males and females with regard to the financial 
information transparency variables in this study. The table also displays the.results of the 
two-tailed significant difference between males and females. 
Table 4 
The Result of Mean Scores and Independent-Sample t test for Males and Females 
Variable Males (N=158) Females (N=147) t 
Mean Mean (two-tailed) 
Ownership 
Structure 
Financial 5.316 4.273 9.67** 
Transparency 
Board 5.639 3.217 14.59** 
Structure 
*p = < .05 **p = < .01 ***PI< .001 
The results indicated that among financial information transparency elements, all 
of the elements had significant difference between males and females. In ownership 
structure, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that the 158 males had a mean 
of 4.51 5; the females had a mean of 3.5 10 in the study, which had the score of mean 
difference 1.005. The means differ significantly at the p < .O1 level (p =.000). In 
financial transparency, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that the 158 males 
had a mean of 5.316; the females had a mean of 4.273 in the study, which had the score 
of mean difference 1.042. The means differ significantly at the p < . O l  level (p =.000). In 
board structure, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that the 158 males had a 
mean of 5.639; the females had a mean of 3.217 in the study, which had the score of 
mean difference 2.42. The means differ significantly at the p < .O1 level (p =.000). 
This finding indicated that males and females were significantly different from 
each other in the elements (ownership sbxcture, financial transparency, and board 
structure) of financial information transparency. This means that males were more 
concerned with strong financial information transparency than females in the Taiwan 
stock market. This result can help us understand that stock market investors who have 
high-quality requirements for information transparency and disclosure, can take the 
desire of improvement with financial information transparency in the Taiwan stock 
market and start their investment strategy more easily with male investors. 
ANOVA Analysis for Question 2 
In this study, age was divided into four groups: 18-30 years, 31-45 years, 46-60 
years, and more than 60 years, which were coded numerically as 1, 2, 3, and 4. Income 
was divided into four groups: less than 10,000 USD, 10,000-25,000 USD, 25,001-35,000 
USD, and over 35,000 USD. ANOVA analysis was used to examine whether there are 
any statistical differences between diverse age groups and income groups in the financial 
information transparency. Post Hoc tests include a Scheffe test to identify which groups 
differ significantly from each other. 
ANOVA Analysis in Ownership Structure According to Age Groups 
According to the Table 5, there was no significant difference which existed among 
the four groups at the .O1 level. The mean difference between each group also was not 
statistically significant. There were no significant differences in the.ownership structure 
of financial information transparency.. Table 6 displays descriptive. information of each 
age group. 
Table 5 
The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of Signzjkant Dzferences in Ownership 
Structure According to Age Groups N=305 
(1) Aee (J) Aee Mean Difference Post Hoc Com~arisons 
p Scheffe p LSD 
18-30 (N=17) 3 1-45 .263 
46-60 .lo6 
>60 .I91 
As shown in Table 6 for descriptive information of each age group in ownership 
structure. The mean of group 18-30 was 4.205 and 4.01 3 in group of over 60 years. 
The Result of Descriptive Iformation of Each Age Group in Ownership Stnlcture 
Age Groups Mean Std' Std. Error Minimum Maximum Deviation 
ANOVA Analysis in Financial Transparency According to Age Groups 
Table 7 displays the result of ANOVA analysis for financial transparency. There 
were no significant difference which existed among the four groups at the .O1 level. In 
Table 8, the data indicate the four age groups did not have means which differed 
significantly (p = < .05) from each other. According to Table 8, descriptive data, age 
group 1 had the highest mean score (M = 5.029) in financial transparency. Age group 4 
had the lowest mean score (M = 4.673) in financial transparency. The results indicated 
that among the four age groups, age group 1 (18-30 years) were more concerned with 
financial transparency in the Taiwan stock market. However, age group 4 (more than 60 
years) paid less attention to financial transparency in the stock market. 
The Result of ANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of Significant Dzfferences in Financial 
Transparency According to Age Groups N=305 
(I) Age (4 Age Mean Difference Post Hoc Comparisons 
p Scheffe p LSD 
18-3O(N=17) 31-45 .074 
46-60 .290 
>60 .355 
As shown in Table 8 for descriptive information of each age group in financial 
transparency. The mean of group 18-30 was 5.029 and 4.673 in group of over 60 years. 
Table 8 
The Result of Descriptive Information of Each Age Group for Financial Transparency 
Std' Std. Error Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation 
ANOVA Analysis in Board Structure According to Age Groups 
Table 9 displays the result of ANOVA analysis for board structure, p = .Q04, there 
was significant difference which existed among the four groups. The asterisks (*) -indicate 
there were two pairs of groups (group 2 and group 3, and group 2 and group 4) whose 
means differ significantly O, = < .05) from each other. According to Table 10, descriptive 
data, group 4 had the highest mean score (M = 4.875) in board structure. Group 4 also 
had a mean differ significantly with group 2 (M = 3.990). The result indicates that among 
four age groups, age group 4 (more than 60 years) paid more attention to the board 
structure, information, and process with corporations. 
Table 9 
The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of SigniJicant Differences in Board 
Structure According to Age Groups N=305 
(1) Age (J) Age Mean Difference Post Hoc Comparisons 
p Scheffe p LSD 
18-30 (Nx17) 31-45 .009 
46-60 -.738 
>60 -.875 
31-45 (N=105) 18-30 -.009 
46-60 -.748* .003 
>60 -.884* .002 
46-60 (N=lll) 18-30 .738 
31-45 .748* .003 
>60 -.I36 
>60 (N=72) 18-30 .875 
31-45 .884* .002 
46-60 .I36 
As shown in Table 10 for descriptive information of each age group in board 
structure. The mean of group 18-30 was 5.029 and 4.673 in group of over 60 years. 
, . The Reslrlt ofDescriptive Information of Each Age Group for Board Structure 
. ~ Std. Error Minimum ~ a x i m i m '  Mean Deviation . . . .. 
The final results represent that there was no effect for ownership structure and 
financial transparency among the four age groups in the study. However, there were 
significant differences existing among the four groups for board structure. Age group 1 
(1 8-30 years) had more concern for financial transparency and information disclosure in 
the Taiwan stock market. On the other hand, group 4 (more than 60 years) paid more 
attention to the board structure, information, and process with corporations. 
ANOVA Analysis in Ownership Structure According to Income Groups 
In this study, individual annual income was divided into four groups: less than 
- 10,00OUSD, 10,000-25,00OUSD, 25,001 -35,00OUSD, and more than 35,00OUSD, which 
were coded numerically as 1,2,3, and 4. One-way ANOVA analysis was used to examine 
whether there are any statistical differences between diverse income groups in the 
financial information transparency. Post Hoc tests include a Scheffe test to identify which 
groups differ significantly from each other. 
According to the Table 11, there was a significant difference which existed among 
the four groups at the .O1 level. Table 12, p = .000, the mean difference between each 
group were also . statistically . significant. There were significant 'differences in the 
ownership structure of financial information transparency. Table 12'displays descriptive 
information of each income group. Group 4 (more than 35k) had the highest mean score : 
(M = 4.674) and group 1 (less than 10k) had lowest mean score (M = 3.318). The result 
indicates that higher income persons had more concern for ownership structure than 
lower income persons. 
Table 11 
The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of Significant Differences in Ownership 
Structure According to Income Groups N=305 
(I) Income (J) Income Mean Difference Post Hoc Comparisons 
p Scheffe p LSD 
Less thanlO~OOO 10,001-25,000 
USD (N=69) -.779* .oo 1 .ooo 
25,001-35,000 -.704* .010 .010 
>35.000 -1.355" .OOO .OOO 
10,000-25,000 Less 
USD (N=107) than10,OOO .779* .001 .ooo 
25,001-35,000 Less 
USD (N=63) than1 0,000 .704* .010 .001 
10,001-25,000 -.074 
>35.000 -.650* ,023 .002 
Over 35,000 Less 
USD(N=66) than10,OOO 
As shown in Table 12 for descriptive information of each income group in : 
ownership structure. The mean of the group less than 10,000 USD was 3.3 18 and 4.674 
for the group of over 35,000 USD. 
Table 12 
The Result of Descriptive Information ofEach Income Group for Ownership Structure 
Std' Std. Error Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation 
Less than10,OOO 3.3 
(N=69) 1.131 .I36 1.5 6.0 
Over 35,000 
(N=66) 4.674 1.138 
ANOVA Analysis in Financial Transparency According to Income Groups 
According to Table 13, there was a significant difference which existed among the 
four groups at the .O1 level. Table 14, p = .000, the mean difference between each group 
also were statistically significant. There were significant differences in the financial 
transparency of financial information transparency. Table 14 displays descriptive 
information of each income group. Group 4 (more than 35k) had the highest mean score 
(M = 4.815) and group 1 (less than 10k) had lowest mean score (M = 3.617). The result 
indicates that higher income persons paid more attention to financial transparency and 
information disclosure than lower income persons in the stock market. 
Table 13 
The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of SigniJicant Dzfferences in Financial : I 
Transparency According to Income Groups N=305 
(I) Income (J) Income Mean Difference Post Hoc Comparisons 
p Scheffe p LSD 
Less UlanlOyOOO 10,001-25,000 USD (N=69) -.748* .000 .OOO 
10,000-25,000 Less 
USD @=I 07) than10,OOO .748* ,000 .OOO 
25,001-35,000 Less 
USD (N=63) than10,OOO 1.108* .OOO .OOO 
10,001-25,000 .360 
>35,000 -.297 
Over 35,000 Less 
USD(N=66) than1 0,000 1.406% .OOO .OOO 
Shown in Table 14 is the descriptive information of each income group in 
financial transparency. The mean of the group less than 10,000 USD was 4.018 and 5.424 
for the group of over 35,000 USD. 
Table 14 
The Result of Descriptive Information of Each Income Group for Financial Transparency 
Mean Std. Std. Error Minimum Maximum Deviation 
Less than10,OOO 
(N=69) 4.01 8 323 .099 1.7 5.7 
io,ooo-zs,ooo 4.766 
(N=107) 1.002 .096 2.0 6.5 
25,001-35,000 5.127 
(N=63) 1.029 .I29 1.7 7.0 
Over 35,000 
(N=66) 5.424 .943 .I16 3.0 7.0 
ANOVA Analysis in Board Structure According to Income Groups 
Table 15 displays the result of ANOVA analysis for board structure, p = .000. 
There was a significant difference existing among the four groups. According to Table 
16, descriptive data, group 4 had the highest mean score (M = 5.666) than the other 
groups in board structure. Group 1 had the lowest mean score (M = 3.3 18). The result 
indicates that among four age groups, income group 4 (more than 35,000USD) paid more 
attention to the board structure, information, and process. 
Table 15 
The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of SigniJicant Dzfferences in Board 
Structure According to Income Groups N=305 
( I )  Income (J) Income Mean Difference Post Hoc Comparisons 
p Scheffe p LSD 
Less thanlO'OOO 10,001-25,000 USD (N=69) -1.083* .001 .OOO 
10,000-25,000 Less 
USD (N=107) than10,OOO 1.083* .001 .OOO 
25,001 -35,000 Less 
USD (N=63) than10,OOO 1.284* .001 .OOO 
10,001 -25,000 .201 
>35,000 -1.063* .007 .001 
Over 35,000 Less 
USD(N=66) than10,OOO 2.347* .OOO .OOO 
10,001-25,000 1.264* .OOO .OOO 
25,001-35,000 1.063* .007 .001 
F=21.039 p= .OOO 
*p = < .05 **p = < .01 ***p = < .001 
As shown in Table 16 for descriptive information of each income group in.board 
structure. The mean of the group less than 10,000 USD was 3.318 and 5.666 for the 
group of over 35,000 USD. 
The Result ofDescriptive Information of Each Income Group for Board Structure 
Std. Std. Error Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation 
Less than10,OOO 3.318 
(N=69) 1.429 .I72 1 .O 7.0 
10,000-25,000 4.401 
(N=l07) 1.725 .I66 1 .O 9.0 
25,001-35,000 4.603 
(N=63) 2.067 .260 1 .O 9.0 
Over 35,000 
(N=66) 5.666 1.639 .201 2.0 9.0 
The final results show that there is an effect for financial information transparency 
among the four income groups in the study. Therefore, there were significant differences 
which existed among the four income groups for ownership structure, financial 
transparency and board structure. Income group 4 (more than 35,000USD) had more 
concern about financial transparency and information disclosure in the Taiwan stock 
market. On the other hand, group 1 (less than 10,000USD) paid less attention to the 
financial information transparency in a stock market, especially in the ownership 
structure with corporations. 
Research Question 3 
Are there differences in TSEC investor behavior according to different categories 
of investor experience? In order to answer research question 3, two statistical analyses 
were employed. They were descriptive statistics and ANOVA analysis. 
ANOVA Analysis for Question 3 
In this study, the number of years of investing experience was divided into three 
groups: less than 4 years, 4-9 years, and more than 9 years, which were coded 
numerically as 1, 2, and 3. ANOVA analysis was used to examine whether there are any 
statistical differences between diverse investing experience groups in the investor 
behavior. Post Hoc tests include a Scheffe test and LSD test to identify between which 
groups differ significantly from each other. 
ANOVA Analysis in Investor BehaviorAccording to Experienced Groups 
According to the Table 17, (p = .507) there were no significant difference existing 
among the three groups at the .01 level. The mean difference between groups also was 
not statistically significant. There were no significant differences in investor behavior 
with investing experience. Table 18 displays descriptive information of each investing 
experience group. 
The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of SigniJicanl Dzfferences in Investor 
Behavior According to Experienced Groups N=305 
(I) Experienced (J) Experienced Mean Post Hoc Comparisons Difference 
D Scheffe D LSD 
Less than 4 years 4-9 years (N=39) 
More than 9 vears -.352 
4-9 years(N=96) Less than 4 years .251 
More than 9 vears -. 100 
More than 9 years 
(N= 170) Less than 4 years .352 
4-9 years .lo0 
F=.68 p= .507 
*p= < .05 **p = < .01 ***p = < .001 
As shown in Table 18 for descriptive information of each income group in 
investor behavior. The mean of the group less than 4 years was 4.341 and 4.694 for the 
group of more than 9 years. 
Table 18 
The Result of Descriptive Information of Each Investing Experience Group for Investor 
Behavior 
Mean Std' Std. Error Minimum Maximum Deviation 
Less than 4 
years 4.341 1.298 .207 1.3 8.0 
(N=39) 
More than 9 
years 4.694 1.841 .I41 1 .O 9.0 
(N=170) 
The final results represent that the number of years of investing experience does 
not affect investor behavior among the three investing experience groups in the study. 
Therefore, there were no significant differences existing among the three groups for 
investor behavior. - -  
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis: -TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency 
dimensions, investor demographic, and investor experience are significant explanatory 
variables of investor behavior in the TSEC. Multiple regression analysis was used to test 
whether there are any statistical differences among variables in the TSEC investor 
perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions. 
Multiple Regression Analysis for Hypothesis Testing 
Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between 
socio-demographic variables (gender, age, income, education level), financial 
transparency variables (ownership structure, financial transparency, board structure), and 
experience variable and the dependent variable of investor behavior. As shown in Table 
20, the F value (62.37) for the overall regression equation was significant (p=.000). The 
adjusted R square indicated the regression equation using the independent variables 
explain 55% (54.8) of the variation in investor behavior. In terms of relative importance 
of these predictors, based on the values of the beta (P) coefficients, the order of 
importance was board structure @=.894), age @=-.870), ownership structure @=.837), 
financial transparency @=.632), education @=.469), gender @=-.41 I), income @=.081),, 
and experience @=.042). 
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As reported, the hypothesis that TSEC investor perceptions of financial 
information transparency dimensions, investor demographic, and investor experience are 
significant explanatory variables of investor of investor behavior in the TSEC was 
partially supported. 
Table 19 
Multiple Regression of Investor Behavior 
Explanatory b SE t BETA(@ P 
Variable 
Gender -1.407 .I60 -8.807 -.411 .OOO 
Education 309 .077 10.496 .469 . .OOO 
Income .I30 .078 1.671 .081 .004 
Experience .lo2 .lo3 .990 .042 .555 
Financial 
Transparency 
Ownership Structure 1.132 .042 26.275 237 .OOO 
Financial 
Transparency 
Board Structure 312 .023 34.711 .894 .OOO 
N=305 
F=62.37 df=8 p<.000 R2=.557 Adjusted R2=.548 
A regression analysis can determine the effect of a set of independent variables on 
the dependent variable. Investor behavior was the dependent variable in this study. A 
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regression analysis of the set of independent variables results in an R2 = .557. The score 
for R square was statistically significant at the .O1 level. The result represents that this 
study has an appropriate set of independent variables to predict the dependent variable. 
According to the score of R square, the independent variables account for 55.7% of the 
variation of the dependent variable. The remaining 44.3% of the variation of the 
dependent variable is due to other variables not included in this study. In general, there 
was a moderately strongly relationship between investor behavior and independent 
variables (ownership structure, financial transparency, board structure). 
According to the Beta @), board structure had the most important effect on 
investor behavior, which was 394 at the .O1 level of significance. The analysis represents 
that board structure was a significant predictor for investor behavior. The findings of this 
analysis are that the independent variables (ownership structure, financial transparency, 
board structure) have a moderately strong affect on investor behavior. That means 
focusing on these independent variables is a positive strategy for corporations to increase 
investment and activity in a stock market. 
Estimates of Construct Validity Using Factor Analysis 
Bryman & Crarner (1 997) suggested that the greater value of Kaiser- Meyer- 
Olkin (KMO) and not less than .5 will be accepted to do the factor analysis for construct 
validity in a study. Stevens (1992) suggested that if the samples of the survey are over 
250, the value of KMO should be above .6. As shown in Table 20, the KMO was .758 
and significant. 
Table 20 
KMO and Bartlettk Test of Distribute on Investor Behavior 
KMO Chi-square d f P 
According to Figure 5 Scree Plot and Table 21 total variance explained, there are 
four components extracted in the survey. Figure 5 Scree Plot showed after component 
number 4 that the Scree becomes a smooth line. The extracted 4 components were 
utilized for this questionnaire design. Table 28 Total Variance Explained presented that 
only four components of Total Initial Eigenvalues value were over 1. Therefore, 
Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings suggested extracted 4 components were 
appropriate for this survey. 
I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I 
I 
1 2  3 4  5 6 7 8 8 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4  
Component Number 
Figure 5: Scree Plot. 
Table 2 1 
Total Variance Explained of Initial Eigenvalues on Questionnaire Design , 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Cumulative Variance % Total % cumulative % Variance 
1 3.593 28.237 28.237 3.593 28.237 28.237 
According to Table 22 Rotated Component Matrix, the components allocation was 
identical with the questionnaire which was designed by the researcher. Therefore, the 
construct validity was identified by factor analysis. 
Table 22 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
*Rotation Method: ~arirn& with ~ a i s e r  ~ormafization 
Estimates of Reliability Using Cronbach's Alpha 
Nunnally (1978) and Devellis (1991) suggested that .7 of Cronbach's Alpha is the 
minimum value acceptable in a survey. As shown in Table 23, the four dimensions for the 
total scale resulted in good internal consistency, evidenced by an alpha of 28. In this 
study, the 3 items ownership structure scale had an alpha of .72. The 5 items financial 
transpafency scale had an alpha of .71. For the board structure scale, the alpha was 36.  
The last dimensions, investor behavior scale, had an alpha of 30. 
Table 23 
Cronbach b Alpha of the Four Dimensions Scale of Investor Behavior 
Instrument (1V= 305) 
Dimensions Number of Items Cronbach's Alpha 
Ownership Structure 3 .7180 
Financial Transparency 
Board Structure 
Investor Behavior 
Total Scale 
Based on Table 23 all dimensions scale of Cronbach's Alpha were over .7. In 
addition, the total scale of Cronbach's Alpha was 3816. Therefore, the instrument for this 
study had good reliability. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, INTERPRETATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, 
LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE STUDY 
Chapter five provides a final review of the study. The following sections are 
included; the summary of the study, the interpretations of the findings, practical 
implications of the findings, conclusions, the limitations of the study, and 
recommendations for hture study. 
Summary of the Study 
Recent cases of accounting fraud, financial misstatements and poor corporate 
governance have become widely publicized. However, the improvement of financial 
information transparency may provide investors the opportunity to conduct their 
investing strategy in the stock market. Investor behavior is the relationship between an 
investor and a company, and the relationship needs to be managed. Therefore, the study 
demonstrated a framework that is grounded in the financial information transparency 
concepts of ownership structure, financial transparency, and board structure in order to 
examine investor behavior. 
This research addressed the following questions and hypothesis: 
Research Questions 
1. Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of 
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock 
Market? 
2. Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of 
financial information transparency according to demographic variables? 
3. Are there differences in TSEC investor behavior according to different 
categories of investor experience? 
Hypothesis 
H: TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions, 
investor demographic, and investor experience are significant explanatory 
variables of investor behavior in the TSEC. 
In order to answer the three research questions and test the hypothesis, the study 
focused on eight independent variables and one dependent variable. The major 
independent variable is financial information transparency, sub-variables for the 
independent variable included ownership structure, financial transparency, and board 
structure. Demographic independent variables included gender, age, education, and 
income. The eighth independent variable is investing experience. The dependent variable 
was investor behavior. 
The research design used a quantitative method with 19 closed-ended questions, 
and one open-ended question on the survey instrument. The questionnaire was scored on 
a 9 point Likert scale (9 = very strongly agree, 5 = neither agree nor disagree, 1 = very 
strong disagree). The study used a sample of investors who have previous investing 
experience in the Taiwan stock market. Data was collected in a period of one week from 
December 1 2 ' ~  to December 18th of 2005. A total of 305 respondents (158 males and 147 
females) completed the survey. Collected data was analyzed by SPSS windows version 
13.0. Five different statistical analyses were employed for the survey. They were 
descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, independent-sample t test analysis, one-way 
ANOVA analysis, ai~d multiple regression analysis. 
Interpretations of Findings 
Research Question 1 
Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of 
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock Market? 
Findings in question 1 reveal that investor behavior had a strong positive 
correlation to the three financial information transparency elements (i.e., ownership 
structure, financial transparency, and board structure) in the Taiwan stock market. Among 
the three elements, board structure had the strongest relationship with investor behavior 
in the study, which was r = 348 and the relationship was statistically significant (p = ,000) 
at the p=< .O1 level. Generally, the results support the inference of financial information 
transparency (ownership structure, financial transparency, and board structure) and 
investor behavior relationship. The findings also supported the hypathesis. 
Research Question 2 
Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of financial 
information transparency according to demographic variables? 
The independent-samples t test can compare the means of two different groups 
such as males and females. The results show that among ownership structure, financial 
transparency, and board structure, there were significant differences between males and 
females in financial information transparency. 
In ownership structure, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that the 
158 males had a mean of 4.5 15; the females had a mean of 3.5 10 in the study, which had 
the score of mean difference 1.005. The means differ significantly at the p < .O1 level (Is 
=.000). In financial transparency, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that 
the 158 males had a mean of 5.3 16; the females had a mean of 4.273 in the study, which 
had the score of mean difference of 1.042. The means differ significantly at the p < .01 
level (p =.000). In board structure, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that 
the 158 males had a mean of 5.639; the females had a mean of 3.217 in the study, which 
had the score of mean difference of 2.42. The means differ significantly at the p < .O1 
level (p =.000). Overall, the findings indicate that males were more concerned with 
strong financial information transparency than females in the Taiwan stock market. The 
findings also support the hypothesis. 
ANOVA analysis was employed to examine whether there are any statistical 
differences between different age groups in financial information transparency in the 
stock market. Post Hoc tests include Scheffe test and LSD test to recognize which groups 
differ significantly from each other. The final results represent that there was no effect 
for ownership structure and financial transparency among four age groups in the study. 
However, there were significant differences which existed among the four groups for 
board structure. Age group 1 (18-30 years) had more concern about financial 
transparency and information disclosure in the Taiwan stock market. On the other hand, 
group 4 (more than 60 years) paid more attention to the board structure, information, and 
process with corporations. The findings also supported the hypothesis. 
ANOVA analysis was used to examine whether there are any statistical 
differences between diverse income groups for financial information transparency. Post 
Hoc tests incIude a Scheffe test and LSD test to identify which groups differ significantly 
from each other. The final results show that there were differences for financial 
information transparency among the four income groups in the study. Therefore, there 
were significant differences which existed among the four income groups for financial 
information transparency. Income group 4 (more than 35,000USD) had more. concern 
about financial information transparency which includes ownership structure, financial 
transparency, and information disclosure, and board structure, information and process in 
the Taiwan stock market. On the other hand, group 1 (less than 10,OOOUSD) paid less 
attention to the financial information transparency, especially in the ownership structure 
and board process with corporations in the stock market. The findings also supported the 
hypothesis. 
Research Question 3 
Are there differences in TSEC investor behavior according to different categories 
of investor experience? 
ANOVA analysis was used to examine whether there are any statistical 
differences between diverse investing experience year groups in investor behavior, Post 
Hoc tests include a Scheffe test and LSD test to identi@ which groups differ significantly 
from each other. The final results represent that there was no difference in any of the 
levels of investing experience group. Therefore, there were no significant differences 
existing among the three groups for investor behavior. The findings also rejected 
hypothesis. 
Generally, the findings support Born et al's (2004) proposition that improving 
corporate governance can lead improvements in information asymmetry between 
company and investors. The findings also support Chiang (2005) who found that 
corporate transparency impacts the corporate performance and investor relationship. The 
findings are also consistent with the concept of Uddin and Gillett (2002) that investor 
behavior might affect corporate transparency and perfomance. 
The results of the study were consistent with Rezaee et al's (2003) findings that 
board structure and process impacts investor behavior. The findings also confirm RandOy 
et al's (2003) and Leng's (2004) proposition that board performance impacts corporate 
performance and investor relationship. The findings also confirm the concept of Ajzen 
and Fishbein (1980), and Donaldson and Davis (1994) that investor behavior will affect 
corporate governance and corporate performance. 
The findings supported Flouris and Walker (2005) who indicated that better 
financial performance would enhance investors' confidence and interest. The findings 
also supported Luoma and Goodstein (1999) who indicated that larger corporations have 
more stakeholder directors on the board to monitor company transparency. The findings 
do not support Fraser (2004) in investor expectations. The findings also do not support 
Gelt and Strawer (2003) that corporate social responsibility impacts investor behavior. 
Practical Implications 
Financial information transparency in the Taiwan Stock Market needs to be 
improved upon. This will require change. However, financial information transparency is 
not a guaranteed path to success for co~porations and investors. There are lots of reasons 
that can affect investor behavior in the stock market. As stock market investing is 
growing in popularity, the more quantitatively empirical. studies in this area are needed 
for investors. 
This study cites some practical implications for creating transparency in the stock 
market: 
1. Among the three major financial information transparency independent variables, 
board structure had the most effect on investor behavior. Additionally, board structure 
was the strongest persuasive predictor for investor behavior. Therefore, if 
corporations want to create a long-term relationship with investors, the most 
important strategy is to provide more transparency of board structure, members' 
personal and trading information, and board committee process for investors in the 
stock market. 
2. The results of the multiple regression analysis showed that the independent variables 
had a moderately strong effect on investor behavior in the stock market. This 
indicated that improving financial information transparency with corporations can 
increase investor activities in the stock market. This finding illustrates that 
corporations could benefit from improving financial information transparency which 
could maintain the relationship with the investor. 
3. The results of this study indicated that males and females were significantly different ! 
of financial information transparency; ownership structure, financial transparency, 
and board structure. This means that males were more concerned with strong 
. financial information transparency than females in the stock market, particularly in 
board structure and financial transparency. Therefore, if corporations want to target 
males, they might consider improving board process information and transparency in 
the stock market to attract more investors. 
Conclusion 
The impact of financial information transparency on investor confidence in the 
Taiwan stock market needs to be addressed. However, it also raises many questions and 
doubts for investors. This study focused on financial information transparency, which 
influences investors' behavior in the stock market. Investor behavior has been widely 
discussed for a few years, but the stock market has changed rapidly since financial 
scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia. Investors need more information about financial 
information transparency to secure their investment. 
This research implemented a mixed method to understand investor behavior in the 
Taiwan stock market. The researcher expected that a mixed method could help to answer 
existing questions and test the hypothesis. Therefore, this study identified how financial 
information transparency impacted investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market. 
This research has addressed and examined by different statistical analyses the 
three research questions. 1. Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of 
dimensions of financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan 
Stock Market? 2. Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension 
of financial information transparency according to demographic variables? 3. Are there 
differences in TSEC investor behavior according to different categories of investor 
experience? This study also has tested one hypothesis. H: TSEC investor perceptions of 
financial information transparency dimensions, investor demographic, and investor 
experience are significant explanatory variables of investor behavior in the TSEC. 
Generally, the study found that improving financial information transparency will 
lead to increase investor activity in the stock market. These findings support the initial 
assumption of the studies, improving financial information transparency in corporations 
can positively affect investor behavior. 
In conclusion, the improvements of financial information transparency address 
stock market efficiency. Corporations need to understand that continuing to improve 
financial information transparency is a way to maintain the relationship with the investor. 
This study provides suggestions to improve financial information transparency to create a 
win-win situation for companies. 
Limitations of the Study 
The following are some limitations, which need to be considered with the 
research findings: 
1. Sample limitation. The sample of this study may not be representative of the 
population of the other countries' investors, because the sample is only derived from 
Taiwan stock market. Due to the nature of the sample, the generalizability of the 
finding is somewhat limited. 
2. Independent variables. Financial information transparency was developed for 
independent variables that affect investor behavior in this study. More independent 
. variables need to be identified in future studies for a better understanding of the stock 
market. 
3. Corresponding finding. The research context of the present study is the stock m d e t ,  
the corresponding findings may not be applicable in other financial product markets 
such as corporate bond market, derivatives market, and other financial markets. 
Recommendations for Future Study 
There are few empirical studies concerning the relationship between financial 
transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market. This study provides some 
findings to fill this gap. Future research may consider both pedagogical and operational 
studies in this area. Recommendations for future study include: 
1. Cross-cultural comparison. Additional studies should consider stock markets in 
different countries to compare investor behavior in markets such as the New York 
Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
The cross-cultural comparison may help us understand if different cultures behave 
differently as investors. 
2. Other specific independent variables. This study focused on financial information 
transparency. Future study may consider other specific factors that can affect investor 
behavior in the stock market such as corporate governance, corporate accounting 
performance, the regulations of a stock exchange, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
3. Improving reliability and validity. For future study, other researchers may replicate 
the research process which was created by the researcher. Additionally, researchers 
may add more questions and items to the questionnaire, reword questions to avoid 
participants from misunderstanding the questions, and revise the instrument to avoid 
bias so that reliability and validity are enhanced. 
4. Other statistical analyses. MANOVA and SEM may be recommended for future study. 
Descriptive statistics, independent sample t test, correlation, ANOVA, and multiple 
regression analysis were used in this survey. MANOVA and SEM analyses are 
recommended for future study to discover other findings. 
5. Future study should also examine if differences in investor behavior exist for 
situations such as; established public companies versus those at the IPO stage, 
long-term investors versus speculators, and institutional investors versus individual 
investors. 
REFERENCES 
Admati, A., & Pfleiderer, P. (2000). Forcing firms to talk: Financial disclosure regulation 
and externalities. Review ofFinancia1 Studies, 13(3), 479-519. Retrieved May 14, 
2004, from ProQuest database. 
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding attitudes andpredicting social behavior. 
New York, NY: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
American Law Institute (1992). Principles of corporate governance: Analysis and 
recommendations: proposed jnal drajl. Philadelphia, PA: American Law 
Institute. 
Anderson, T., & Kanuka, H. (2003). e-Research: Methods, strategies, and issues. Boston, 
MA: Pearson Education Inc. 
Anonymous (1999). Transparency. Quarterly Review of Doublespeak, 25(4), 8-9. 
Retrieved May 14,2004, from ProQuest database. 
Atkins, N. (1999). Communication and politics: Transparency, dialogue and ethical 
decision-making. Vital Speeches of the Day, 65(1 I), 347-35 1. Retrieved May 14, 
2004, from ProQuest database. 
Babbie, E. (1991). Survey research methods (znd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Babbie, E. (2002). The practice of social research (91h ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Backer, L.C. (2002). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Federalizing norms for officer, lawyer, 
and accountant behavior. St. John's Law Review, 76(4), 897-951. Retrieved May 
14,2004, from ProQuest database. 
Baker, T. L. (1999). Doing social research (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill College. 
Bhattacharya, S. (1979). An exploration of non-dissipative dividend-signaling structures. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 14(4), 667-668. 
Black, T. R. (1999). Doing quantitative research in the social science: An integrated 
approach to research design, measurement and statistics. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publication, Inc. 
Blair, M.M. (1995). Ownership and control. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 
Born, P., Giaccotto, C., & Ritsatos, T. (2004). The wealth and information effects of 
insurer's open market stock repurchase announcements. Risk Management and 
Insurance Review, 17(1), 25-40. 
Borg, W. R., & Gall, M. D. (1983). Educational research: An introduction (4th ed.). New 
York: Longman. 
Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting 
Review, 72(3), 323-349. 
Boyd, B. (1995). CEO duality and firm performance: a contingency model. Journal of 
Strategic Management, 16(4), 301 -3 12. 
Bryman, A. & Cramer, D. (1997). Quantitative data analysis with SPSS for windows, 
London: Routledge. 
Burgess, T. F. (2001). A general introduction to the design of questionnaires for survey 
research. Retrieved September 1, 2005, from University of Leeds Information 
System Services Web site: 
http:N www.leeds.ac.uk/iss/documentation/top/top2.pdf 
Carpenter, M. A., Pollock, T. G., & Leary, M. M. (2003). Testing a model of reasoned 
risk-taking: governance, the experience of principals and agents, and global 
strategy in high-technology IPO firms. Strategic Management Journal, 24(9), 
c 803. 
Chen, L. C. (1 999). ModernJinancial management. (2ed). Taiwan: Hawtai. 
Chiang, H. (2005). An empirical study of corporate governance and corporate 
performance. Journal of American Academy of Business, 6(1), 95-1 01. 
Christopherson, R., Greqoriou, G N. (2004). Lagged factors affecting Berkshire 
Hathaway. Journal ofAsset Management, 5(4), 272-276. 
Clarkson, M.B.E., (1994). A risk based model of stakeholder theory, The Centre for 
Corporate Social Performance & Ethics, University of Toronto. Retrieved May 14, 
2004, from ProQuest database. 
Creswell, J. W. (2002). Educational Research: planning, conducting, and evaluation 
quantitative and qualitative research. New Jersey: Merrill & Pearson, Inc. 
Desai, A., Kroll, M., & Wright, P. (2003). CEO duality, board monitoring, and 
acquisition performance: a test of competing theories. Journal of Bu,siness 
Strategies, 20(2), 137. 
DeVellis, R. F. (1991). Scale Development Theory and Applications. London: SAGE. 
Dillman, D. A. (2000). Mail and Internet surveys: The tailored design methods (2nd ed.). 
New York: John Wiley & Son, Inc. 
Dimovski, V., & Skerlavaj, M. (2004). A stakeholder theory approach to the 
organisational performance and influence of information-communication 
technology: model conceptualization and testing. Economic and Business Review 
for Central and South-Eastern Europe, 6(3), 245-265. 
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J.H. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO 
governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 
49-65. 
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J.H. (1994). Boards and company performance - Research 
challenges the conventional wisdom. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 2(3), 151-60. 
Epstein, E. (1987). The corporate social policy process: Beyond business ethic, Corporate 
social responsibility, and corporate social responsiveness. California Management 
Review, Berkeley Spring 29(3) 99-1 44. 
Fama, E. & Jensen, M. (1983a). Agency Problems and Residual Claims. Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26,327-375. 
Fama, E. & Jensen, M. (1983b). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26,301-326. 
Florini, A. (1998). The end of secrecy. Foreign Policy, 11 1, missing pages. Retrieved 
May 14,2004, from ProQuest database. 
Flouris, T., Walker, T. J. (2005). The financial performance of low-cost and full service 
airlines in times of crisis. Canadian Journal of Administrative Science, 22(1), 
3-20. 
Fong, T. S. (2004). The impact of web site design on consumer loyalty in 
business-to-customer (B2C) internet commerce: A rhetorical approach. Doctoral 
Dissertation, Lynn University. 
Fraser, P. (2004). How do US and Japanese investors process information, and how do 
they from their expectation of the future? Evidence from quantitative survey 
based data. Journal of Asset Management, 5(2), 77-90. 
Freeman, E. R. (1 984). Strategic management - A stakeholder approach. London: Pitman 
Freeman, E. R. (1994). The politics of stakeholder theory: some future directions. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 4(4), 409-42 1. 
Fried, J. M. (2003). Insider abstention. The Yale Law Journal, 113(2), 455-515 
Gay, L. R. (1996). Educational research: Competencies for analysis and application 
(jth ed.). Upper Saddler River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Gelb, D. S. & Strawer, J. C. (2001). Corporate social responsibility and financial 
disclosure: an alternative explanation for increased disclosure. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 33(1), 1-1 3. 
Hanson, M. (2003). The global promotion of transparency in emerging markets. Global 
Governance, 9(1), 63. 
Harris, M. & Raviv A. (1978). Some results on incentive contacts with applications to 
education and employment, health insurance, and law enforcement. American 
Economic Review 68: 20-30. 
Hawley, J., &Williams A. (1996). Corporate governance in the United States: The rise of 
fiduciary capitalism, Working Paper, Saint Mary's College of California, School 
of Economics and Business Administration. 
Healey, T. J., & Kim, Y. J. (2003). The benefits of mandatory auditor rotation. 
Regulation, 26(3), 10. 
Hill, C.W.L. & Jones, T.M. (1992). Stakeholder - Agency theory. Journal of 
Management Studies, 29(2), 13 1-1 84. 
Holzner, B., & Holzner, L. (2002). The transparency syndrome in global change: A 
sociological concept paper. Ekistics, 69(412/414), 152. 
Jackson, H. E. (2003). To what extent should individual investors rely on the mechanisms 
of market efficiency: A preliminary investigation of dispersion in investor returns. 
Journal of Corporation Law, 28(4), 671-689. 
Jenson, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 
303-360. 
Jucca, L. (2004). Government accounting worse then private sector. Retrieved June 20, 
2005, from 
http:/lwww.reuters.com~newsArticle.jh&l?=6407932 
Kulzick, R. S. (2004). Sarbanes-Oxley: Effects on financial transparency, S.A.M. 
Advance Management Journal, 69(1) 43-49. Retrieved May 14, 2004, from 
ProQuest database. 
Lang, M., & Lundholm, R. (1993). Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of 
corporate disclosures, Journal of Accounting Research, 31,246-271. 
Lashgari, M. (2004). Corporate governance: theory and practice. Journal of American 
Academy of Business, Cambridge, 5(1/2),46-51. 
Leech, N. L., Barrett, K. C., & Morgan, G. A. (2005). SPSS for intermediate statistics: 
use and interpretation (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Leland, H., Pyle, D. H. (1977). Information Asymmetry, Financial Structure and 
Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance, 32(2), 37 1-3 88. 
Leng, A. C. A. (2004). The impact of corporate governance practices on firm's financial 
performance: evidence fiom Malaysian companies. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 
21(3), 308-318. 
Lenter, D., Slemrod, J.,& Shackelford, D. (2003). Public disclosure of corporate tax 
return information: Accounting, economic, and legal perspectives. National Tax 
Journal, 56(4) 803. 
Luoma, P,& Goodstein, J. (1999). Stakeholders and corporate boards: institutional 
influences on board composition and structure. Academy of Management Journal, 
42(5), 553-563. 
Malkiel, B. G. (2002). EfJicient market hypothesis, the new palgrave dictionary of money 
andjnance. New York: MacMillan. 
McGuire, J., Dow, S.,& Argheyd, K. (2003). CEO incentives and corporate social 
performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 45(4), 341. 
Monks, R.A.G. (1994). Relationship investing. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 2(2), 58-76. 
Moore, F., & Swartz, N. (2003). Keeping an eye on Sarbanes-Oxley. Information 
Management Journal, 37(6), 20. Retrieved May 14, 2004, from ProQuest 
database. 
North, D. (1994). Economic performance through time. American Economic Review, 
359-368. 
Nunnally, J. C. (1978). Psychometric theoly. (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company. 
O'Hara, P. A. (2000). Insider trading in financial markets: legality, ethics, and efficiency. 
International Journal of Social Economics, 28(10/11/12), 1-12. 
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: the organization 
and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17,218-245. 
Poitevin, M. (1990). Strategic financial signaling. Internal Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 8(4), 499-518. 
Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Self-regulation and securities markets. Regulation, 26(1), 32-39. 
Quall, J. C. (2004). Implementing Section 404: A practical approach to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The CPA Journal, 74(8) 52- 58. 
Ramirez, S. (2003). A flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley reform: can diversity in the boardroom 
quell corporate corruption? St. John's Law Review, 77(4) 837-866. 
RandOy, T., Down, J., & Jenssen, J. (2003). Corporate governance and board 
effectiveness in maritime firms. Maritime Economic& Logistics, 15(1), 40. 
Ravid, S.A., Saring, O.H. (1991). Financial signaling by committing to cash outflows. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 26(2), 165- 18 1. 
Rezaee, Z., Olibe, K. O.,& Minmier, G. (2003). Improving corporate governance: the role 
of audit committee disclosures. Managerial Auditing Journal, 18(6/7) 530-537. 
Riahi-Belkaoui, A. (2003). Intellectual capital and firm performance of US multinational 
firms. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 4(2), 21 5. 
Rogers, J. (2003). Good governance doesn't just happen: Judging ourselves. Vital 
Speeches of the day. 69(15) 464. 
Ross, S. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem. American 
Economic Review, 63(2): 134-1 39. 
Ross, S. (2000). Responsible Investing. Sierra Sun Francisco, Nov/Dec 85(6) 26-28. 
Sappington, D. (1991). Incentives in principal agent relationships. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 3(2): 45-66. 
Sarno, L., & Thornton, D. L. (2004). The efficient market hypothesis and identification in 
structural VARs. Review- Federal Reserve Bank ofst. Louis, 86(1), 49. 
Shaw, J. D., Gupta, N., & Delery, J. E. (2000). Empirical organizational-level 
examinations of agency and collaborative predictions of performance-contingent 
compensation. Strategic Management Journal, 21(5), 61 1. 
Snider, J., Hill, R. P., & Martin, D. (2003). Corporate social responsibility in the 21'' 
century: A view from the world's most successful firms. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 48(2), 175. 
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 57(3), 
355-379. 
Spence, M. and R. Zeckhauser (1971). Insurance, information and individual action. 
American Economic Review 61(2): 380-387. 
SPSS Inc. (2005). SPSS BASE 13.0-Applications Guide. Chicago: SPSS Inc. 
Sridharan. U.V., Dickes L., & Caines. W. R. (2002). The social impact of business failure: 
Enron. Mid-American Journal of Business, 17(2), 1 1-21. Retrieved May 14,2004, 
from ProQuest database. 
Standard & Poor's company (2002). Transparency and disclosure: overview of 
methodology and study result- United States. Retrieved May 20, 2005, from 
ProQuest database. 
Standard & Poor's company (2002). Standard & Poor's corporate governance scores: 
criteria, methodology and definitions. Retrieved May 20, 2005, from ProQuest 
database. 
Stevens, J. (1992). Applied Multivariate Statistics for the Social Sciences (2nd ed.). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) 2004. Retrieved September 15,2005 
http://~~~.tse.com.tw/ch/statistics/statistics.php?hn=O7 
Trailer, J. W., Rechner, P., & Hill, R. C. (2004). A compounded agency problem: an 
empirical examination of public-private partnerships. Journal of American 
Academy of Business, Cambridge, 5(1/2), 308-3 15. 
Uddin, N. & Gillett, P.R. (2002). The effects of moral reasoning and self-monitoring on 
CFO intentions to report fraudulently on financial statements. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 40(1) 3. 
Vishwanath, T., & Kaufmann, D. (2001). Toward transparency: New approaches and 
their application to financial. The World Bank Research Observer, 16(1), 41-57. 
Retrieved May 14,2004, from ProQuest database. 
Waring, P., & Lewer, J. (2004). The impact of socially responsible investment on human 
resource management: A conceptual framework. Journal of Business Ethics, 
52(1) 99. 
Young, B. (2003). Corporate governance and firm performance: Is there a relationship? 
Ivy Business Journal Online, Sep/Oct 1. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aaker, J., Foumier, S., & Brasel, S. A. (2004). When good brands do bad. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 31(1) 1-16. 
Aihashim, D. D. (2002). The accounting crisis as a result of the Enron case, and its 
implications on the U.S. accounting profession. Journal of American Academy of 
Business, Cambridge, 2(1) 21 0-214. 
American Psychological Association. (2001). Publication manual of the American 
Psychological Association. (51h ed.). Washington, DC: Author. 
Analytica (1992). Board Directors and Corporate Governance: Trends in the G7 
Countries Over the Next Ten Years. England: Oxford Analytica Ltd. 
Anonymous (2003). The good, the bad, and their corporate code of ethics: Enron, 
Sarbanes-Oxley, and the problems with legislating good behavior. Haward Law 
Review, 11 6(7) 2 123. Retrieved May 14,2004, from ProQuest database. 
Baxter Jr, T. C. (2003). Governing the financial or bank holding company: How legal 
infrastructure can facilitate consolidated risk management. Current Issues in 
Economics and Finance, 9(3) 1-7. 
Beattie, A. (2000). G24 coalition bristles at IMF demands for fiscal transparency. 
Financial Time, 16. Retrieved May 14,2004, from ProQuest database. 
Beecher-Monas, E. (2003). Corporate governance in the wake of Enron: An examination 
of the audit committee solution to corporate fraud. Administrative Law Review, 
55(2), 357. 
Bhattacharya, U., Groznik, P., & Haslem, B. (2003). Is CEO certification credible? 
Regulation, 26(3), 8. 
Bossone, B., & Lee, J. K. (2004). In finance, size matters: The "systemic scale 
economies" hypothesis. IMF StaffPapers, 51(1) 19-46. 
Boyce, G. (2000). Public discourse and decision making exploring possibilities for 
financial, social and environmental accounting. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 13(1) 27. 
Boylan, S. J. (2004). A classroom experiment on the benefit of auditing in financial 
markets. Issues in Accounting Education, 19(2), 189- 209. 
Brewer, J. (1996). Editorial. Corporate Governance QuarterZy, Hong Kong Institute of 
Company Secretaries, March 2(1), 1. 
Business Objects. (2004). Business objects launches new Sarbanes-Oxley analytic 
solution to help businesses manage compliance. Retrieved March 10, 2005, from 
http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/googe/index.jsp?ndmViewId =news 
Byington, J. R., & Christensen, J. A. (2002). A high stakes game of risk for the 
independent auditor. Southern Business Review, 28(1) 20-28. Retrieved May 14, 
2004, from ProQuest database. 
Carrigan, C. R., Carrington, A., Cocozza, T., & Rabun, D. (2003). Rx for financial 
statement acceleration-using technology to ease the pain. The Journal of 
Government Financial Management, 52(2) 34. 
Cashell, J. D.,& Aldhizer, I11 G. R. (2004). Construction contract auditing in local 
government entities. The Journal of Government Financial Management, 53(1) 
42-49. 
Chambers, V.,& Crowley, P. (2003). Capitalism and accounting reform. S.A.M. Advanced 
Management Journal, 68(3) 44. 
CIO view. (2004). CIO view delivers security now! : provides financial transparency for 
IT security; increases security auditor productivity 90%. Retrieved May 14, 2004, 
from 
http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news~vie 
w&news 
Clark, J. M., Ferrell, L., & Ferrell, 0. C. (2003). Conflicts of interest arising from the 
prudent investor rule: Ethical implications for over-the-counter derivative 
securities. Journal of Business Ethics, 47(2), 165. 
Cordella, T., & Yeyati, E. L. (1998). Public disclosure and bank failures. International 
Monetary Fund, StaffPapers -International Monetary Fund, 45(1) 1 10- 13 1. 
Cox, P., Brammer, S., & Millington, A. (2004). An empirical examination of institutional 
investor preferences for corporate social performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 
52(1) 27. 
Daily Times. (2004). EU strikes accounting deal, misses transparency goal. Retrieved 
May 14,2004, from http://www.dailytimes.com.pWdefault.asp?page5l8 
Dondog, L. (2004). Implementing international accounting standards (IAS) 
implementation in Mongolia. The Journal of Government Financial Management, 
53(3) 8-9. 
Dorsey, W. (2003). Behavioral trading: Methods for measuring investor confidence, 
expectations and market trends. Retrieved September 20, 2004, from 
h t t p : / / w w . e c o n o m i c s - f i n a n c e . c o m / B e h a ~ r  - Measurin 
g-Investor-Confidence - Expectations-and-Market-Trends-1587991640.html 
Drucker, P. (1976). The unseen revolution: How pension fund socialism came to America. 
New York: Harper & Row. 
Elias, R. Z. (2002). Determinants of earnings management ethics among accountants. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 40(1/3) 33-45. Retrieved May 14, 2004, from 
ProQuest database. 
FDIC (2002). Enhancing financial transparency. Retrieved May 14, 2004, from 
http://ww.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2002/072402.html. 
Fekrat, M A. (1998). Multinationality: The financial accounting implications. Managerial 
Finance, 24(5) 42-52. 
Fountain, J.R., Patton, T. K., & Steinberg, H. I. (2004). Improving performance reporting 
for government: New guidance and resources. The Journal of Government 
Financial Management, 53(1) 60-64. 
Furman, J., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1998). Economic crises: Evidence and insights from east 
Asia. Brooking Papers on Econonzic Activity 2 1 - 135. 
Gara, S. C., & Langstraat, C. J. (2003). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A new 
ballgame for accountants. The University of Memphis Law Review, 34(1) 73-1 14. 
Retrieved May 14,2004, from ProQuest database. 
Gates, M. N. (2003). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and non-US issuers: Consideration for 
international companies. Journal of Commercial Biotechnology, 10(1), 40. 
Gerde, V. W.,& White, C.G. (2003). Auditor independence, accounting firms, and the 
securities and exchange commission. Business and Society, 42(1) 83-1 14. 
Giles, J. P., Venuti, E. K., & Jones, R. C. (2004). The PCAOB and convergence of the 
global auditing and accounting profession. The CPA Journal, 74(9) 36-39. 
Goh, K. L. (2003). Does consumer confidence forecast consumption expenditure in New 
Zealand? Retrieved September 14,2004, from http:llwww.treasuny.govt.nz 
Graves, S., & Waddock, S. (1994). Institutional owners and corporate social performance. 
Academy of Management Journal 37(4), 1034-1046. 
Hall, S. C. (2003). Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Journal of Financial Service 
Professionals, 57(5), 14. 
Heinemann, F., Nagel, R., & Ockenfels, P. (2004). The theory of global games test: 
experimental analysis of coordination games with public and private information. 
Econometrica, 72(5) 1583-1 599. 
Jansen, W. J., & Nahuis N. J. (2002). The stock market and consumer confidence: 
European evidence. Retrieved September 14, 2004, form 
http:l/www.technicalanalysis.org.uk 
Leeds, R. (2003). Breach of trust: Leadership in a market economy. Haward 
International Review, Fa11 25(3) 76. 
Lewis, K. D. (2002). The responsibility of the CEO: Providing ethical and moral 
leadershp. Vital Speeches of the Day, 69(1), 6-9. 
McGowan, D. M., & Brisendine, A. T. (2003). What's next after Enron and 
Sarbanes-Oxley? Benejts Law Journal, 16(1), 94-105. 
Metzger, L. M. (2004). Accounting ethics, imagine that. The Journal of Government 
Financial Management, 53(1) 22-27. 
MENAFN-Middle East North Africa Financial Network. (2004). Bahrain to ensure 
highest standards of transparency. Retrieved May 14, 2004, from 
http:l/www.menafn.comlqn~news~story~s.asp?SttoryId=65386 
Montana, J. (2003). Sarbanes-Oxley one year later. Information Management Journal, 
37(4), 18. 
Multinational Monitor (2002). Accounting for bad accounting. Washington Jan/Feb 
23(1&2) 36. 
Pergola, T. M. (2005). Management entrenchment: can it negate effectiveness of recently 
legislated governance reform? Journal of American Academy of Business, 6(2), 
177-183. 
PhD. (2004). The valuation effect of investor behavior on the relevance of financial 
information. Retrieved May 20, 2005, from 
http://wwwlib.urni.com/dissertations/fullci3 11 81 19 
Phelan, S. E. (1997). Exposing the illusion of confidence in financial analysis. 
Management Decision, 35(2) 163-1 68. 
Robertson, D.M., & Tortora, A. A. (2003). Reporting requirements for lawyers under 
Sarbanes-Oxley: Has Congress really changed anything? The Georgetown 
Journal of Legal Ethics, 16(4) 785. Retrieved May 14, 2004, from ProQuest 
database. 
Russel, P. S. (2004). Money Laundering: A global challenge. Journal of American 
Academy of Business, Cambridge, 259 (112) 259-265. 
Schenk, J. J., & Yoder-Wise, P. S. (2002). Professional self-regulation- another Enron 
casualty? The Journal of Continuing Education in Nursing, 33(3) 100-101. 
Seeholzer, R. (2004). Into the light. RiskManagement, 51(9) 40-44. 
Semple, J. W. (2003). The effect of fhe Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the attorney-clinet 
privilege. FDCC Quarterly, 53(4), 41 9. 
Shende, S., & Bennett, T. (2004). Transparency and accountability in public financial 
administration. Retrieved May 14,2004, from 
http://unpanl .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/udunpanOO7716.pdf 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. (1996). A survey of corporate governance, national bureau 
of economic research, Working Paper 5554, Cambridge, MA. 
Snyder, J. (2005). Regulation of lawyer conduct under Sarbanes-Oxley: minimizing 
law-firm liability by encouraging adoption of qualified legal compliance 
committees. The Review oflitigation, 24(1), 223-252. 
Stephenson, C. (2004). Rebuilding trust: The integral role of leadership in fostering 
values, honesty and vision. Ivey Business Journal Online, Jan/Feb I. 
Swartz, N. (2003). The cost of Sarbanes-Oxley. Information Management Journal, 
3 7(5) 8. 
Thompson, J. W., & Lange, G. (2003). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the changing 
responsibilities of auditors. Review of Business, 24(2) 8-12. Retrieved May 14, 
2004, from ProQuest database. 
Turban, D., & Greening, D. (1996). Corporate social performance and organisational 
attractiveness to prospective employees. Academy of Management Journal 40(3), 
Wallace, W.A. (2004). Inter-country public sector comparisons and harmonization of 
international accounting, auditing and regulation. The Journal of Government 
Financial Management, 53(3) 10- 16. 
Waring, C. G., & Daugherty, C. A. (2004). Auditing ethics-make them an offer they can't 
refuse. The Journal of Government Financial Management, 53(1) 34-40. 
Waxman, R. N. (2004). A Test of Controls. The CPA Journal, 74(8) 26-32. 
Wendland, T. A. (2003). Measuring governmental performance-the accountants weigh in. 
The Journal of Government Financial Management, 52(3) 56. 
West, J. P.,& Berman, E. M. (2002). Increasing urban government financial 
accountability: The role of multiple stakeholders. Journal of Public Budgeting, 
Accounting &Financial Management, 14(4) 497-534. 
Wheeler, D. & Grayson, D. (2001). Session 2- Business and its stakeholders. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 32(2) part 2. 
Wyman, P. (2004). Is auditor independence really the solution? The CPA Journal, 74(4) 
6- 7. 
Appendix A 
Authorization for Voluntary Consent 
Lynn University 
THIS DOCUMENT SHALL ONLY BE USED TO PROVIDE AUTHORIZATION FOR VOLUNTARY 
CONSENT 
PROJECT TITLE: EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION TRANSPARENCY ON 
INVESTOR BEHAVIOR I N  TAIWAN STOCK MARKF,T 
Project IRB Number: 2005-045 Lynn University. 3601 N. Military Trail, Boca Raton, Florida 3343 1 
I, Hsiu-Jen Fu, am a doctoral student at Lynn University. I am studying Global Leadership, with a 
specialization in Corporate and Organizational Management. Part of my education is to conduct a 
research study. 
DIRECTIONS FOR TEE PARTICIPANT 
You are being asked to participate in my research study. Please read this carefully. This fom provides 
you with information about the study. The Principal Investigator (Hsiu-Jen Fu) will answer all of your 
questions. Ask questions about anything you don't understand before deciding whether or not to 
participate. You are tke to ask questions at any time before or after your participation in this study. 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can refuse to participate without penalty or loss of benefits 
to which you are otherwise entitled. 
PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH STUDY The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of 
financial information transparency on investor behavior in Taiwan stock market. There will be 
approximately 300 of people participating in this study. These are investors who have experience with 
buying shares in Taiwan stock market. The participants must be 18 years and older. 
PROCEDURES: AU participants will be invited to participate via questionnaire that provided by the 
researcher. In this survey, the questionnaire will collect from investors who have at least 18 years old 
and who have experience buying shares in Taiwan. The researcher will stand outside of the underwriter 
office to look for investors who meet the requirements and are willing to be a participant. You will be 
prompted to answer questions about your perception of fmancial information transparency. It takes 
about 10 minutes to complete. When the survey is completed by the participants, the researcher will 
collect the questionnaires. The participants will not write any identifier on the questionnaire and no one can 
identify the respondents from this survey. This survey will be anonymous and voluntary. You. will 
finish the survey in private and the researcher will not collect any identifying information linking the 
participant to the survey data. 
POSSIBLE RISKS OR DISCOMFORT This study involves minimal risk. You may find that some 
of the questions are sensitive in nature. In addition, participation in this study requires a minimal 
amount of your time and effort. 
POSSIBLE BENEFITS: There may be no direct benefit to you in participating in tbis research. 
However the results of the study will be important to corporations, investor behavior, and other 
researchers. Corporations may benefit greatly by identifying the most important factors of investors' 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects 
Lynn University 
3601 N. Military Trail, Boca Raton, Florida 33431 
decisions. Investors may benefit greatly by financial information transparency survey. Other researchers 
may benefit by duplicating this study and finding other factors based on this study. 
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS: There is no financial compensation for your participation in 
this research. There are no costs to you as a result of your participation in this study. 
ANO-. Anonymity will be maintained to the entire survey. The researcher will not identify 
you and data. Individual responses will not be identified nor tracked as part of data collection. 
Participation in this survey is voluntary and return of the completed survey will constitute your informed 
consent to participate. No one can connect to the researcher's personal database pool except the 
researcher. The data and questionnaires will be kept in a locked cabinet for five years and than 
destroyed after five years. The results of this study may be published in a dissertation, scientific journals 
or presented at professional meetings. Your anonymity will be maintained in all publications or 
presentations results from this study. 
RIGJ3T TO WITHDRAW. You are free to choose whether or not to participate in this study. There 
will be no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled if you choose not to participate. 
CONTACTS FOR QUESTIONSIACCESS TO CONSENT FORM: Any further questions you have 
about this study or your participation in it, either now or any time in the future, will be answered by 
Hsiu-Jen Fu (Principal Investigator) who may be reached at:  or  
and Dr. Ralph J. Norcio, faculty advisor who may be reached at:  or  
For any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, you may call Dr. Farideh Farazrnand, Chair 
of the Lynn University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects, at  
 or email to  If any problems arise as a result of your participation in 
this study, please call the Principal Investigator (Hsiu-Jen Fu) and the faculty advisor (Dr. Ralph J. 
Norcio) immediately. 
A copy of this consent form will be given to you. 
INVESTIGATOR'S AFFIDAVIT: I have carefully explained to the subject the nature of the above 
project. The person participating has represented to me that helshe is at least 18 years of age, and that 
helshe does not have a medical problem or language or educational bamer that precludes hisher 
understanding of my explanation. I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the person who is 
signing this consent from understands clearly the nature, demands, benefits, and risks involved in hisher 
participation and histher signature is legally valid. 
Date of IRB Approval: 12 / 12 / 2005 7.7. 
one year 
from date of 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects 
Lynn University 
3601 N. Military Trail, BocaRaton, Florida 33431 
Appendix B 
Authorization for Voluntary Consent (Chinese Version) 
Lynn University 
SdtR#i IRB a%: 2005045. Lynn University 3601 N. Military Trail Boca Ralon, Florida, 
FL 33431 
*A,E%B Lynn University a* %WE, R%i€GH%f I#t@SR@tBB , B80MB 
~%B&IBE~-s%raF%ZBRBQZL-~HEWB,W;SLIW%dIBBraFh%i$ 
q&BtmBftl?;a;gl:am%rsaajJ\sBa, ~~w~aa+mwaama@. an. 
% % E B H % ~ ~ % { & R S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ $ I ~ J C \ ~ ~  
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects 
Lynn University 
3601 N. Military Trail, Boca Raton, Florida 33431 
%0912-338700)%&VRt%3%B Dr. Ralph J. Norcio (BaiiBE )!3l~~ 
E~BHkW%tSL%%Ei?S , %?.3b%!E% Lynn University iRB f L% Dr. Farazmand (%% 
EE  %%@BBLTJf%EiX%ffflBtf . SfLLBBf Zraf%B MBWR 
%lWrl?2 Dr. Ralph J. Norcio. &% , %#@%k-W%#tl.$. 
IRB Approval &;f$ E3 flB: 12/12 / ZOO 5 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects 
Lynn University 
3601 N. Military Trail Boca Raton, Florida 33431 
Appendix C 
Certification of Translation 
B TRANSNA TIONA I,  SER l?lCES, INC 
R760 S.W. 80Ih Street. Miami. FL33173 
Ts1 :   a ax:  
E-mail:  
CERTIFICATE OF ACCURACY 
STATE OF FLORIDA) 
) SS: 
COUNTY OF DADE) 
Mr. Haiyan Wang, a certified Chinese and Russian translator and interpreter for U.S. 
Department of State, Federal Courts, Miami Immigration Courts, Miami-Dade and 
Broward County Courts and a member in good standing of the American Translators 
Association (ATA), being duly sworn, deposes and says, 
That he is fluent in both the English and the Chinese languages. 
That he has translated the annexed documents from the English into the Chinese language 
described as A. Directions For the Participant; B. The Investor Behavior Ouestionnaire 
consisting of l p a g e s  for each document, that this is a true and complete translation to 
the best of his knowledge, ability and belief. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me at Miami-Dade County, Florida on this 8th 
day of December, 2005 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public (Seal) 
Appendix D 
Survey of Instrument 
The Investor Behavior Questionnaire 
Suwey Instructions 
Please follow the directions below to complete this survey. 
In answering all of the questions, please use a scale from 1 to 9 where 1 means 
"very strongly disagree", 5 means "neither agree nor disagree", and 9 means 
"very strongly agree". Write a number in the space provided that best indicates 
your feelings about the question. 
Section I :  Financial Information Transparency and Disclosure 
Rate the following questions from 1 to 9. Please use the scale as explained in the survey instructions. 
Transparency of Ownership 
1. - The company's web site helps me to understand ownership structure 
information. 
2. Shareholder meetings help me to understand a corporation's performance. 
3- - I will buy a corporation's shares if it offers specific ownership structure 
information to me. 
Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure 
4. - The company's web site helps me to understand financial information. 
5. I will buy a corporation shares if it offers timely financial information to me. 
6. - I trust a corporation's financial statements. 
7. - I trust a corporation's financial statements that are approved by an 
independent accountant. 
8. - I believe that good information transparency will make the stock market more 
efficient? 
Board Structure and Process 
9. - I will buy a corporation's shares if it provides pertinent information on its 
Board members. 
10. I will buy shares if a corporation demonstrates both financial success and 
social responsibility. 
Section 2: Investor Behavior 
Rate the following questions from 1 to 9. Please use the scale as explained in the survey instructions. 
Corporate Scandals 
11. Corporate scandals make me reduce my shareholding. 
12. Corporate scandals make me lose confidence in the stock market. 
13. Corporate scandals are the responsibility of accountants. 
Government Regulations 
14. Government regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 2002, in the United 
States make me more likely to buy a corporation shares. 
Please write your responds regarding your basic information 
15. Gender 
Male Female 
16. Age 
18-30 31-45 D 46-60 more than 60 years old 
17. Highest Level of Education 
High school degree or under 2 years college degree Bachelors degree 
Masters degree or above 
18. Experience in buying corporation shares 
less than 4 years 4 to 9 years more than 9 years 
19. Annual income (USD) 
13 less than 10,000 10,000 to 25,000 25,001 to 35,000 niore than 35,000 
20. Do you have any additional comments regarding investor behavior? Please write 
below: 
Appendix E 
Suwey of Instrument (Chinese Version) 




Lynn University 
Principal Investigator: Hsiu-Jen Fu 
Project Title: Effects of Financial Information Transparency on Investor Behavior In Taiwan 
Stock Market. 
IRB Project Number 2005-045 : 
APPLICATION AND PROTOCOL FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN 
SUBJECTS OF A NEW PROJECT: Request for Exempt Status -Expedited Review- 
Convened Full-Board X 
IRB ACTION by the CONVENCED FULL BOARD 
Date of IRB of application and Research Protocol 12/12/05 
IRl3 ACTION: Approved X Approved w/provision(s) - Not Approved- Other- 
COMMENTS 
Consent Required: No - Yes X Not Applicable - Written X Signed - 
Consent forms must bear the research protocol expiration date of 12/12/06 
Application to ContinueRenew including an update consent, is due: 
(1) For a Convened Full-Board Review, two month prior to the due date for renewal X 
(2) For an Expedited IRB Review, one month prior to the due date for renewal_ 
(3) For review of research with exempt status, one month prior to the due date for 
renewal - 
Name of IRB Chair (Print) Farideh Farazmand 
Signature of IRB Chair - Date: 12/12/0 5 
Cc: Dr. Norcio 
Dissertation Chair 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects 
Lynn University 
3601 N. Military Trail Boca Raton, Florida 3343 1 

